Even More on Evo on the Daily Show

As usual, I'm a little late to the party (it's what not being able to blog until the end of a long day does to me). Evo appeared on the Daily Show on Tuesday and it's just about all the craze in the Bolivian-American blogosphere these days. All of the blogs I like to visit, Pronto*, MABB, Boz, Gringo Tambo, and others, have covered it.

I provided my two cents to some friends and family earlier today and I thought I'd just get to the botoom line now: Evo did well but thank goodness John Stewart is a comedian and not a real journalist. Otherwise, things could have gotten ugly.

Bolivia and Iran to Initiate Diplomatic Relations (Updated)

Apropos the post below, it appears that Ahmedinejad is now going to go to Bolivia on Thursday. La Razon reports that he will be bearing gifts too: the initiation of diplomatic relations with La Paz and the strengthening of commercial ties. Again, I just don't see what's in this for Bolivia.

Update: Ahmadinejad arrived in Bolivia this afternoon and already the newspapers are fretting over how this will affect US-Bolivian relations. In this post, Bolivian blogger Mario Duran provides a glimpse into the status of Bolivian civil liberties in Evo's democracy. Why is it relevant? Because it happend while he waited for Ahmadinejad's motorcade to pass.

The Mystery of Bolivia-Iran Relations

I don't get Evo Morales. I mean, I understand that he is knee-jerk anti-American and has a man-crush on Hugo Chavez, but I don't get why he is so careless at times. So seemingly myopic.
Case in point: Iran. Iran is a country that has managed to piss-off the Americans, Europeans, most Middle Eastern countries, and even the Russians and the Chinese. It is a country that kidnaps, for what else would you call it, innocent expats that return home for a visit with the family. A country the US claims, with justification, is actively supporting combat operations against US troops in Iraq and NATO troops in Afghanistan. A country that is known to support terrorists organizations such as Hezbollah. A country whose leader has expressed the wish that Israel should be wiped off the map. A country that is pursuing a nuclear weapons program and is in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. A country that has such bad relations with the US that many observers around the world are already beating war drums.

For Bolivia, this last point is particularly important. The US is the second most important market for Bolivian exports (behind Brazil) as well as a significant source of foreign assistance. Just as Venezuela is Bolivia's political and ideological patrón, the US is a major component of Bolivia's economic lifeline. US-Bolivian relations may not be at their most enlightened right now, but Bolivia is still significantly dependent on the US. Witness Alvaro Garcia Linera's recent visit to the US, lobbying for an extension of trade preferences.

Given the dynamics of the US-Bolivian relationship, why would the Bolivian government be cozying up to Iran at this particular time and run the risk of further eroding its relationship with the United States? One potential "benefit" for Bolivia could be further cementing its relationship with Venezuela (as there is no tangible benefit that a relationship with Iran can provide that will not be off-set by a break in US-Bolivia relations). But what can Iran do for Bolivia? Neither Iranian military nor political support count for much given Venezuela's competing influence (as well as the Chinese influence in the arms arena). Sure, Bolivia can talk about Iranian investment in Bolivian energy, but Iran is not the only country that is willing to do this.

It seems, then, that Bolivia is doing this only for the benefit of Venezuela (because Chavez's stock rises in the eyes of Ahmedinejad if Venezuela is able to "deliver" countries to Iran). Worse, not only does Bolivia not gain anything, its own interests are held at significant risk because, whether it wants to admit it or not, Bolivia needs the US to stay at least economically engaged. The US is not going to break relations over any one issue, but an accumulation of "issues" may drive the US to take a harder stance and that can only be bad for Bolivia. I don't see how Bolivia "wins" in this scenario, particularly given the dangers of further isolating the US. It's just poor statecraft.

Vigilantism in Guatemala

Yesterday, Reuters came out with an article on vigilantism in Guatemala, a consequence of the on-going gang problem. This is not the first report of it kind. There have been similar reports focused on other countries in Central America. El Salvador comes to mind (though I can't locate that article).

The gang problem in Central America does not get the type of serious attention and consideration it deserves. It is a slow-motion train wreck with significant implications for human rights, governability, democracy, and to some degree, even US security. Whatever gains have been made since the end of the wars in Central America, they are threatened by the gang crisis. Vigilante groups could easily evolve to into gangs. Police can easily be, and have been, involved in extrajudicial killings. Impunity can be rampant. In nearly all of these countries the military is operating in "support" of police forces, without adequate legal authorities, command and control mechanisms, and competent judicial structures. This is bad juju and it does not take much imagination for this scenario to spiral into failing state category.

Bolivian Army's Evolving Mission

Two articles came out in La Razon yesterday and today dealing with the Bolivian Army's elite baking unit, the 44th Regimental Baking Company. Just kidding, that's not the name of the unit. And the Bolivian Army doesn't have an elite baking unit. Not yet. (sidebar: boy, La Razon is really a good paper to get information dealing with Bolivian security forces. You'll notice I cite them aplenty) .

Anyway, these are a good set of articles to discuss the role of the armed forces in society. According to the articles, Evo Morales presented the Army with a "gift" of some industrial ovens and now the Service has a new mission, to make bread for the surrounding community. The concept, apparently, is that the Army will bake the bread and sell it at a reduced cost to citizens. There is some debate over details, such as should the bread be primarily for the consumption of the Army and only the surplus sold to civilians or should enough bread be made to feed the Army and sell to the civilians, but it seems clear that the future for some Army units means baking bread for the surrounding population.

Though it seems silly on the face of it, in fact this is not necessarily a bad use, if inefficient, of Bolivia's armed forces. Unlike militaries in developed countries, militaries in underdeveloped countries like Bolivia are already being used in to supporting civilian infrastructure. For example, in Bolivia the Air Force already operates commercial flights to the interior. In other countries, such as Armenia, Army garrisons make their health facilities available to townspeople. These types of "additional duties" are not necessarily bad and they do provide a valuable service to the country (though some "services" are more controversial than others, such as when the military provides school teachers, as has happened in Venezuela).

Of course, there are trade-offs. While these types of duties may aid the country in some ways, they can also hamper it in others and, as well, retard the capabilities of the military. In this case, the subsidised military bread will surely undercut some family-owned, small business bakeries. Of course, every time the military gets involved in commercial sales the possibility of graft and corruption are there. And if the business generates enough revenue, then effective civilian and democratic control of the military can also become an issue if not adequately controlled. On the other side of the coin, while the Army's bread may be cheaper for civilians, the cost to the government to produce the bread is likely significant in actual cost and in the opportunity cost associated with having soldiers baking and selling as opposed to training for combat or civil disturbance. And, let's be candid, Bolivia's armed forces need all the training they can get.

A related question, and one that is beyond the scope of this current post, gets at the shifting threat environment in Latin America and how this affects, or should affect, the roles and responsibilities of the region's militaries.

Bolivian MANPADS Redux

File this under It Could Be Nothing, But....

In 2005 the US rendered a bunch of Bolivian Chinese-made MANPADS inoperable. With the agreement of the Bolivian Armed Forces, the US took these weapons from their storage locations in Bolivia and flew them to the US for a quick snip-and-tuck. From the US perspective, in a post 9-11 world it wasn't a good idea to have poorly secured MANPADS floating around. And, given the lose Bolivian controls and porous borders, Bolivia seemed a likely candidate in which to implement this policy.

So imagine my surprise when I saw this article reporting that, in Brazil, between April 2005 and July 2007, Brazilian cops confiscated 9 "anti-air" weapons (armas antiaéreas) with the Bolivian Coat of Arms stamped on them.

Obviously, this means that the Bolivian Army or Ministry of Defense officials are selling weapons. I get that. Not a big surprise. But what I don't understand is what the heck are "armas antiaéreas"? That sounds like air defense weapons to me, but could they be...MANPADS? What other kinds of "armas antiaéreas" could they be talking about? They surely can't be talking about anti-aircraft guns, I can't imagine those suckers being dragged through the jungle (with due respect to the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu and the North Vietnamese Army at Khe Sanh--at least those guys were fighting a war).

Does this mean that the US missed some MANPADS? Or that they new of the leakage and that is what prompted the US to act in Bolivia? Of course, the article could be just plain wrong. It could be spin or an outright lie. Like I said, it could be nothing, but....

Smart Politics: US Certifies Bolivia in the Drug War

It appears that the US has certified Bolivia's fight against illicit drugs. In doing so, US aid to Bolivia will not be interrupted. Laying aside the monumental failure and waste of time that the US "war on drugs" has become, the Bush administration's decision to certify Bolivia is smart politics (and another example of why Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon is the right man at the right time). First, Bolivia is teetering on the edge of chaos and the last thing the US needs to do is insert itself in this combustible mix. A de-certification could have created a rallying cry for Evo's supporters and aggrieved nationalists and, undoubtedly, put some wind back in Evo's sails (at a time when, it appears, he is backing into a corner and could possibly make some concessions to the opposition). No need to push Bolivia into failed state status.

Also, a de-certification would have aided Chavez's cause more than ours. I know many proud Bolivians and Evo supporters like to pretend otherwise, but Evo is Chavez's puppet. There is very little free agency going on here. The US recognizes this and, in its policy, it *should* seek to drive a wedge between the two knuckleheads. The drug certification process does this by de-certifying Venezuela, but certifying Bolivia. A Bolivian de-certification would have validated, in Evo's and his supporters' eyes, the relationship with Chavez. It would have strengthened the Venezuela-Bolivia relationship and further weakened the US-Bolivia relationship.

Buyer Beware: Chavez Invests in Bolivian Security Forces

Interesting article in La Razón, today. Apparently the Bolivian police and the military are accusing each other of accepting Venezuelan aid.

General Wilfredo Vargas, Commander of the Armed Forces, denied that Venezuela provides assistance to the armed forces and asked that such questions be raised with the National Police.

The Inspector General of the National Police, Fernando Peláez, responded that his institution is not the one that received checks for forts, just equipment that will benefit the country’s citizens. (My translation)

In Bolivia there is long-standing enmity between the armed forces and the national police due to jealousies and mistrust over social status, funding, and a blurring of appropriate roles and missions caused by the war on drugs. In February 2003, the National Police mutinied in La Paz and the resulting rebellion saw military personnel engaging police in intense, if limited, firefights.

It is extremely unlikely that a police vs. military confrontation in the scale of the February 2003 rebellion will take place soon. But interesting to note how both institutions are playing this charade of “no, we don’t get aid from Venezuela” when, in fact, both organizations have received assistance from Chavez and will continue to do so.

So, what’s the story behind these denials? A couple of weeks ago Bolivia’s Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramon Quintana, denounced several social scientist types for working with USAID or on projects funded by USAID. Quintana allegedly called these people “vendepatria,” which is akin to being called a traitor. No one likes to be called a “vendepatria,” especially those whose jobs are to secure the patria.

But, in the interest of keeping things real, let’s recall this La Razon article from two weeks ago.

Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramon Quintana, confirmed yesterday that Venezuela directly deposits US$6 million into accounts opened by the Bolivian government for use by the military services to improve military infrastructure. (my translation)

The article goes on to say that in June the Army received US$5,491,462, the Navy US$1,181,000, and the Air Force US$771,395.

It’s official, Chavez is buying the country’s military. Who’s the vendepatria now?

Colombia shifts its eradication strategy

Last fall I attended a security cooperation conference sponsored by the National Defense University. One of the speakers was a Colombian government official who let it be known the Uribe government was investigating the possibility of shifting its drug eradication strategy from aerial spraying to manual eradication. Had I blog back then, I would have blogged about it as it is a significant development. Since that conference nearly one year ago, it appears that the Uribe government has made up its mind.

Colombia's vice president said Sunday that a U.S.-backed program to fumigate coca fields is failing to stem cocaine trafficking and called for anti-drug efforts to shift away from the practice. Vice President Francisco Santos' comments were Bogota's strongest critique yet of Washington's multibillion-dollar anti-narcotics strategy here, and came on the heels of a Senate vote to slash funding for the Colombian drug war.

"After a five-year frontal attack against drug trafficking, the results aren't the most successful or the ones we hoped for," Santos told a news conference.

Here’s the full article. In the interest of balance, let me address the anti-American slant in the quote above. As its underwriter, the United States does bear significant influence on Colombia’s drug eradication strategy. Without US assistance, it is unlikely that Colombia would have enough resources to both fight the insurgency and the drug trafficking. However, to lay the aerial spraying solely at the door of the US is problematic and intellectually dishonest. While the US has influence and funding, Colombia has veto power. It is their country. The aerial spraying may have been proposed by the US (or not, I really don’t know what the genesis of this is), but the Colombian government has always been an eager and willing participant.

I can speculate as to why aerial spraying was initially chosen as the eradication strategy of choice. First, starting up aerial spraying is cheaper than manual eradication. All you need is a few planes, a small crew, fuel, and herbicide. For manual eradicators you would need very many of them and they each would need to be trained, provided with uniforms and equipment, fed, and housed. The cost for all of this is significantly larger. Second, aerial spraying is more efficient. Whereas it would take a platoon of manual eradicators significant time to clear one field (whatever size) of illicit coca, presumably a couple of plane loads of herbicide could do the job in just a few swoops and the pilot can return to base in time for breakfast. Third, it is less violent than manual eradication since you avoid, to a much larger degree, direct conflict between the eradicators and the coca growers, traffickers, and guerrilla forces (which ever the case may be). Sure, there may be a plane crash or a shoot down here and there, but by and large, it is a significantly less violent form of eradication.

There are some downsides to this strategy, however, and these may have contributed to the decision to stop aerial spraying. First, aerial spraying is susceptible to countering tactics. In this case, coca growers developed an early warning system so that they had time to cover their crops while the plane was in-bound. This neutralized the herbicide as it never reached the coca leaves. Similarly, once the plane left, cultivators would immediately wash out the herbicide with buckets of water thereby limiting its effectiveness. Second, aerial spraying was effective when cultivators planted in open fields on hill sides. But cultivators quickly adapted and began planting inside national forests where the canopy limited somewhat the growth of their crops but also negated the government’s ability to spray. Also, if you really want to be sure a crop is eradicated, there is only way to do it: rip it from the soil, roots and all. In short, as the “enemy” adapted, aerial spraying reached its culmination point. It simply was no longer as effective as when it was first employed.

Coca eradication is a significant challenge. Ask the Bolivians. Given the risks associated with manual eradication, expect to see increased violence in the Colombian countryside and, as well, increased allegations of human rights violations. And also, much slower progress. On the plus side, maybe some of the demobilized paras can now be gainfully employed.

More Questions Than Answers

Latin News Daily is reporting that Peruvian officials arrested three Peruvian Army soldiers on suspicion of selling weapons to FARC guerrillas. The weapons were AK-47s and, reportedly, the FARC was willing to pay up to $3,800 per rifle. As the article points out, this is an unusually large sum of money for an AK (the soldiers ended up getting paid $800 per rifle, which is more reasonable if still a bit high). The article also notes that the large sum the FARC was willing to pay indicates they are having a hard time keeping their armories stocked.

I buy the argument that the high price is a matter of supply and demand, that's basic economics. But I wonder what is driving this phenomenon? Have Colombian military operations been successful in closing some supply lines? Or has Colombian diplomacy impacted the situation some how? Or both?

And another question. When Chavez announced he was going to purchase 100,000 AKs from Russia, many analysts suspected these rifles would end up in the hands of the FARC. Even if it wasn't Venezuelan state policy to provide the FARC with these weapons, went the theory, wouldn’t it be profitable for some Venezuelan commanders and government officials to sell them? Honestly, it's hard to argue with that logic.

But as far as I know, the 100,000 rifles have long ago arrived Venezuela. If the theory above is correct, why is there such a great demand by the FARC for these Peruvian rifles? Presumably, that demand would have been met by the Venezuelan surplus And if the surplus weapons didn’t go to the FARC, where are they? Are they destined for the new Venezuelan National Guard, rather than the Venezuelan military? Or are they part of Venezuelan security assistance to countries such as Bolivia?

Ja, ja!!!

As the old adage goes, people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones. Bolivian Interior Minister Juan Ramon Quintana is a former Bolivian Army officer. I believe he retired as a Major. After retirement he went into the defense and national security analysis bidness. In fact, he wrote an excellent book about the Bolivian Army's personnel system called Soldados y ciudadanos, about 10 years ago, or so. He also has extensive experience in foreign policy (used to be an advisor to the Foreign Affairs committee in the Casa de Deputados.

When Evo became prez, Quintana formed part of his cabinet and assumed his current position last year. It turned out that he is one of the more influential (so as not to say, "radical") members of Evo's cabinet. In particular, his vehement anti-American stand surprised me.

Two weeks ago, Minister Quintana flat out lied about USAID, claiming the aid organization sought to buttress opposition to Evo's government (ironically, just one day after the nation was paralyzed by significant work stoppages in 2/3 of the country, coincidence?). Quintana even spotlighted some prominent Bolivian social scientists who were working on projects funded by USAID. Well, it turns out that Minister Quintana has in the past benefited from US security assistance funding. La Razon has the write up. Juan, you hypocritical bastard.

Now, having said all that, there is room for discussion regarding what the purpose of US foreign assistance funds are for. As this issue with Quintana highlights, there is also ample room to discuss the potential unintended consequences of the foreign assistance reforms currently being implemented in the Department of State (the aptly-named, "F process").

Bolivia: Deepening Ties with Iran

Bolivian newspaper Los Tiempos reports on Minister of Foreign Affairs David Choquehuanca's visit to Iran and the signing of political and economic cooperation accords. According to the article, this is the culmination of reinvigorated Bolivian-Iranian relations. The process started when Ahmedinejad traveled to Latin America and met with Chavez, Morales, and Daniel Ortega.

While Choquehuanca was touring Iranian energy plants, Morales was accompanies by the Iranian Ambassador to Bolivia, Abdolah Zifan, during a visit to Cochabamba. Morales invited Iran to invest in Bolivia's energy sector and Ambassador Zifan invited Morales to visit Tehran. La Razon from La Paz has this coverage.

Bolivia: VP in US, But Where's the Quid Pro Quo?

Bolivian Vice president Alvaro Garcia Linera is in the US. He is here to try to persuade the US Congress to extend a trade preference act (the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act--ATPDEA) that allows Bolivian goods, particularly textiles, to enter the US at significantly reduced tariffs. Said act was extended once already. Garcia's pitch is that whatever other issues there may be between Bolivia and the US, particularly Evo's big mouth, his closeness to Chavez, and his bad coca policies (in order of increasing concern to the US), they should not affect trade, which benefits both countries. Well, he is right on one count. Trade does benefit both countries. Whether Congress will continue to extend the trade preferences agreement while not receiving nothing in return is still up in the air.

This is tough call to make. On the one hand, it behooves the US to stay engaged in Bolivia and to maintain or protect a salvageable level of relations. On the other hand, Evo, for all the righteousness of his cause, is dismantling Bolivia's democracy piecemeal. In the long run, this will create only more instability in the country and in the region. Not a good scenario for the US, but there is very little the US can do to influence those types of governance decisions. But the US has more options when it comes to influencing other policies. The United States is Bolivia's most significant trade partner, shouldn't it use some of this influence to try to affect the course of, say, Bolivia's current coca policy? Or pressure a shift in Bolivia's increasingly warm relations with Iran?