Yesterday the Bolivian Chief of the Armed Forces, General Wilfredo Vargas, the highest ranking military man in Bolivia, responded to calls for military intervention in the simmering social/political/regional crisis by calling opposition leaders "cowards."
The military should be congratulated for that stance, even though it may not be an altruistic position. In years past, the military would have likely been quick to storm the presidential palace and take over government, given the level of violence and insecurity in Bolivia. In the last 20 years or so, however, the concept of defending a democratic constitution vice an administration or political position has begun to taken hold within the military ethos, causing the armed forces to make careful calculations and second guess their instinct to act.
Of course, as opposition leaders suggest, the military leadership is being bribed into compliance, and undoubtedly this helps them toe the party line, but I can't help think that should the Evo administration make some egregious assault on democratic norms in Bolivia, the military would likely act no matter how much they are getting paid. After all, they have institutional interests at stake as well. Barring this, the military chiefs will stay quite with the $40K they are allegedly being paid and democracy will not so much be assaulted to death, but instead it will be a death by a thousand decrees.
Of course, this doesn't mean that there will not be a "Major's Revolt" in the future, since presumably the $40K is only going to the chiefs of the services and the booty is not being pushed down to other levels of command.
December 8, 2007
December 7, 2007
In Bolivia The Opposition Strikes Back
To the opposition in Bolivia, as well as to every objective thinking person around the world, it is hard to separate the events going on in Bolivia, and particularly the policies of Evo Morales, from the influence of Hugo Chavez. As I've said before, Chavez holds much sway with Evo. Immediately following Evo's inauguration, for example, Bolivia and Venezuela signed a series of bilateral agreements dealing with trade and energy cooperation. A bit later a military cooperation agreement was signed that provided legal cover for Venezuela to send, and Bolivia to receive, military forces engaged in training and infrastructure development.
Predictably, rumors of Venezuelan military support for purposes of maintaining the Morales government in power began to spread, aided by statements made by Chavez on more than one occasion. Opposition representatives have claimed that Venezuela is, in fact, illegally shipping arms to Bolivia. Today they should get a chance to prove it.
Yesterday, a mob in the city of Riberalta stormed the airport and threw stones at a Venezuelan Air Force C-130 transport plane that they believed to be carrying a shipment of arms. The mob assaulted one Venezuelan who deplaned and the pilots were eventually able to fly out of the airport.
Bolivian government authorities claimed the aircraft was only carrying spare parts and personnel on their way back to Caracas and the stop in Riberalta was not to unload supplies or weapons but simply to refuel.
After taking off from Riberalta the cargo plane tried landing in at least two other nearby airports but was deterred by the presence of more mobs. It finally flew to the Brazilian town of Rio Branco. Today a group of opposition leaders were to fly to the Brazilian town to investigate the cargo the plane was carrying. La Razon has the story here. Reuters has a report in English, here.
This event could be indicative of a shift in the opposition strategy. They are now trying to internationalize their fight.
Exhibit A: Previously they were content to make allegations against Venezuelan interference, maybe go as far as a protest in front of the Venezuelan Embassy, but never before, that I know, had they actually planed, organized, and executed an assault on what they suspected was a Venezuelan arms shipment. This is very symbolic. In effect, they assaulted the Venezuelan military.
Exhibit B: It is likely not a coincidence that this action was taken precisely when opposition leaders from the Media Luna departments where in Washington DC seeking support from the OAS and speaking in think tanks before American audiences.
Exhibit C: It comes at a time when Chavez's influence in the region is in a slight wane, following the King of Spain's public rebuke of him and on the heels of Chavez's first electoral defeat.
Regardless of what the plane holds in its cargo bay (and in this instance I believe the Bolivian Government), it is clear that the opposition means business. This event requires significant organizational capabilities to pull off.
Predictably, rumors of Venezuelan military support for purposes of maintaining the Morales government in power began to spread, aided by statements made by Chavez on more than one occasion. Opposition representatives have claimed that Venezuela is, in fact, illegally shipping arms to Bolivia. Today they should get a chance to prove it.
Yesterday, a mob in the city of Riberalta stormed the airport and threw stones at a Venezuelan Air Force C-130 transport plane that they believed to be carrying a shipment of arms. The mob assaulted one Venezuelan who deplaned and the pilots were eventually able to fly out of the airport.
Bolivian government authorities claimed the aircraft was only carrying spare parts and personnel on their way back to Caracas and the stop in Riberalta was not to unload supplies or weapons but simply to refuel.
After taking off from Riberalta the cargo plane tried landing in at least two other nearby airports but was deterred by the presence of more mobs. It finally flew to the Brazilian town of Rio Branco. Today a group of opposition leaders were to fly to the Brazilian town to investigate the cargo the plane was carrying. La Razon has the story here. Reuters has a report in English, here.
This event could be indicative of a shift in the opposition strategy. They are now trying to internationalize their fight.
Exhibit A: Previously they were content to make allegations against Venezuelan interference, maybe go as far as a protest in front of the Venezuelan Embassy, but never before, that I know, had they actually planed, organized, and executed an assault on what they suspected was a Venezuelan arms shipment. This is very symbolic. In effect, they assaulted the Venezuelan military.
Exhibit B: It is likely not a coincidence that this action was taken precisely when opposition leaders from the Media Luna departments where in Washington DC seeking support from the OAS and speaking in think tanks before American audiences.
Exhibit C: It comes at a time when Chavez's influence in the region is in a slight wane, following the King of Spain's public rebuke of him and on the heels of Chavez's first electoral defeat.
Regardless of what the plane holds in its cargo bay (and in this instance I believe the Bolivian Government), it is clear that the opposition means business. This event requires significant organizational capabilities to pull off.
December 3, 2007
Who Will Stand Up For Bolivian Democracy?
I know I promised a detailed critique of Max Boot's op-ed. I'm still working on it.... It's just got kind of long and unwieldy for a blog. Maybe if I break it down and post it as separate blog entries....
In the mean time, let's take a stroll through the two big news items in Latin America this past week.
The biggest item, by far, is that Chavez lost Sunday's constitutional referendum in Venezuela by the slimmest of margins, 51 to 49 percent. (If you don't know what I'm talking about...Chavez proposed major constitutional reforms that would have allowed him to serve unlimited terms as president and consolidate significant political, bureaucratic, and economic power. In short, this would have been the first step towards dictatorship in Venezuela). The defeat of his proposal is good news to defenders of democracy, bad news to lefties that would like to inflict on Venezuela a totalitarian "socialist" system. No doubt that as I type this, Chavez and his cronies are already plotting ways to overcome this set-back and forge ahead with plans to further consolidate power and continue in office past 2012, when Chavez's current term is supposed to expire. Four years can't come soon enough. The opposition in Venezuela should take advantage of this situation, come together, and build momentum to move forward.
One question regarding Chavez's defeat is how will this impact Evo's actions in Bolivia, the second news item of the week. MABB and Pronto have extensive coverage of the unfortunate developments in Bolivia since Thanksgiving, so I won't go into the details here. Bolivia now finds itself in a dangerous position, with the country and society polarized seemingly more than ever. So much so that the failure of the Bolivian state is now an issue should things continue with no amelioration. Evo is undoubtedly following the Chavez blueprint. Indeed, the Venezuelan President is probably the most influential advisor in the Casa Quemada and Evo's ill-conceived actions over the last week likely have Chavez's finger prints all over them. So what does Chavez's defeat on Sunday mean for Evo? Will he see Chavez's defeat and draw the conclusion that his constitutional reforms could meet a similar fate if he does not moderate his position and seek greater consensus? You would hope so.
In the mean time, let's take a stroll through the two big news items in Latin America this past week.
The biggest item, by far, is that Chavez lost Sunday's constitutional referendum in Venezuela by the slimmest of margins, 51 to 49 percent. (If you don't know what I'm talking about...Chavez proposed major constitutional reforms that would have allowed him to serve unlimited terms as president and consolidate significant political, bureaucratic, and economic power. In short, this would have been the first step towards dictatorship in Venezuela). The defeat of his proposal is good news to defenders of democracy, bad news to lefties that would like to inflict on Venezuela a totalitarian "socialist" system. No doubt that as I type this, Chavez and his cronies are already plotting ways to overcome this set-back and forge ahead with plans to further consolidate power and continue in office past 2012, when Chavez's current term is supposed to expire. Four years can't come soon enough. The opposition in Venezuela should take advantage of this situation, come together, and build momentum to move forward.
One question regarding Chavez's defeat is how will this impact Evo's actions in Bolivia, the second news item of the week. MABB and Pronto have extensive coverage of the unfortunate developments in Bolivia since Thanksgiving, so I won't go into the details here. Bolivia now finds itself in a dangerous position, with the country and society polarized seemingly more than ever. So much so that the failure of the Bolivian state is now an issue should things continue with no amelioration. Evo is undoubtedly following the Chavez blueprint. Indeed, the Venezuelan President is probably the most influential advisor in the Casa Quemada and Evo's ill-conceived actions over the last week likely have Chavez's finger prints all over them. So what does Chavez's defeat on Sunday mean for Evo? Will he see Chavez's defeat and draw the conclusion that his constitutional reforms could meet a similar fate if he does not moderate his position and seek greater consensus? You would hope so.
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