In Bolivia the Military Chief Takes a Side

Yesterday the Bolivian Chief of the Armed Forces, General Wilfredo Vargas, the highest ranking military man in Bolivia, responded to calls for military intervention in the simmering social/political/regional crisis by calling opposition leaders "cowards."

The military should be congratulated for that stance, even though it may not be an altruistic position. In years past, the military would have likely been quick to storm the presidential palace and take over government, given the level of violence and insecurity in Bolivia. In the last 20 years or so, however, the concept of defending a democratic constitution vice an administration or political position has begun to taken hold within the military ethos, causing the armed forces to make careful calculations and second guess their instinct to act.

Of course, as opposition leaders suggest, the military leadership is being bribed into compliance, and undoubtedly this helps them toe the party line, but I can't help think that should the Evo administration make some egregious assault on democratic norms in Bolivia, the military would likely act no matter how much they are getting paid. After all, they have institutional interests at stake as well. Barring this, the military chiefs will stay quite with the $40K they are allegedly being paid and democracy will not so much be assaulted to death, but instead it will be a death by a thousand decrees.

Of course, this doesn't mean that there will not be a "Major's Revolt" in the future, since presumably the $40K is only going to the chiefs of the services and the booty is not being pushed down to other levels of command.

In Bolivia The Opposition Strikes Back

To the opposition in Bolivia, as well as to every objective thinking person around the world, it is hard to separate the events going on in Bolivia, and particularly the policies of Evo Morales, from the influence of Hugo Chavez. As I've said before, Chavez holds much sway with Evo. Immediately following Evo's inauguration, for example, Bolivia and Venezuela signed a series of bilateral agreements dealing with trade and energy cooperation. A bit later a military cooperation agreement was signed that provided legal cover for Venezuela to send, and Bolivia to receive, military forces engaged in training and infrastructure development.

Predictably, rumors of Venezuelan military support for purposes of maintaining the Morales government in power began to spread, aided by statements made by Chavez on more than one occasion. Opposition representatives have claimed that Venezuela is, in fact, illegally shipping arms to Bolivia. Today they should get a chance to prove it.

Yesterday, a mob in the city of Riberalta stormed the airport and threw stones at a Venezuelan Air Force C-130 transport plane that they believed to be carrying a shipment of arms. The mob assaulted one Venezuelan who deplaned and the pilots were eventually able to fly out of the airport.

Bolivian government authorities claimed the aircraft was only carrying spare parts and personnel on their way back to Caracas and the stop in Riberalta was not to unload supplies or weapons but simply to refuel.

After taking off from Riberalta the cargo plane tried landing in at least two other nearby airports but was deterred by the presence of more mobs. It finally flew to the Brazilian town of Rio Branco. Today a group of opposition leaders were to fly to the Brazilian town to investigate the cargo the plane was carrying. La Razon has the story here. Reuters has a report in English, here.

This event could be indicative of a shift in the opposition strategy. They are now trying to internationalize their fight.

Exhibit A: Previously they were content to make allegations against Venezuelan interference, maybe go as far as a protest in front of the Venezuelan Embassy, but never before, that I know, had they actually planed, organized, and executed an assault on what they suspected was a Venezuelan arms shipment. This is very symbolic. In effect, they assaulted the Venezuelan military.

Exhibit B: It is likely not a coincidence that this action was taken precisely when opposition leaders from the Media Luna departments where in Washington DC seeking support from the OAS and speaking in think tanks before American audiences.

Exhibit C: It comes at a time when Chavez's influence in the region is in a slight wane, following the King of Spain's public rebuke of him and on the heels of Chavez's first electoral defeat.

Regardless of what the plane holds in its cargo bay (and in this instance I believe the Bolivian Government), it is clear that the opposition means business. This event requires significant organizational capabilities to pull off.

Who Will Stand Up For Bolivian Democracy?

I know I promised a detailed critique of Max Boot's op-ed. I'm still working on it.... It's just got kind of long and unwieldy for a blog. Maybe if I break it down and post it as separate blog entries....

In the mean time, let's take a stroll through the two big news items in Latin America this past week.

The biggest item, by far, is that Chavez lost Sunday's constitutional referendum in Venezuela by the slimmest of margins, 51 to 49 percent. (If you don't know what I'm talking about...Chavez proposed major constitutional reforms that would have allowed him to serve unlimited terms as president and consolidate significant political, bureaucratic, and economic power. In short, this would have been the first step towards dictatorship in Venezuela). The defeat of his proposal is good news to defenders of democracy, bad news to lefties that would like to inflict on Venezuela a totalitarian "socialist" system. No doubt that as I type this, Chavez and his cronies are already plotting ways to overcome this set-back and forge ahead with plans to further consolidate power and continue in office past 2012, when Chavez's current term is supposed to expire. Four years can't come soon enough. The opposition in Venezuela should take advantage of this situation, come together, and build momentum to move forward.

One question regarding Chavez's defeat is how will this impact Evo's actions in Bolivia, the second news item of the week. MABB and Pronto have extensive coverage of the unfortunate developments in Bolivia since Thanksgiving, so I won't go into the details here. Bolivia now finds itself in a dangerous position, with the country and society polarized seemingly more than ever. So much so that the failure of the Bolivian state is now an issue should things continue with no amelioration. Evo is undoubtedly following the Chavez blueprint. Indeed, the Venezuelan President is probably the most influential advisor in the Casa Quemada and Evo's ill-conceived actions over the last week likely have Chavez's finger prints all over them. So what does Chavez's defeat on Sunday mean for Evo? Will he see Chavez's defeat and draw the conclusion that his constitutional reforms could meet a similar fate if he does not moderate his position and seek greater consensus? You would hope so.

Earlier this month it appeared the State Department was going to force a handful of Foreign Service Officers to serve their country in Iraq. There was much diplomatic hand-wringing in Foggy Bottom at the prospect. God forbid diplomats do their duty at a time and in a place their country needs them most. Though this "diplomatic crisis" has come to an end thanks to a few honorable volunteers, the ample news coverage the "revolt" received brought renewed attention to the difficulties the US Government is, nay has been, having coming to terms with the international threat environment ever since the end of the Cold War.

Two op-ed pieces on this very topic recently appeared in the Washington Post and the New York Times. The first and by far the best one is written by Hans Binnendijk, a professor at the National Defense University (here). The inferior op-ed, written by Max Boot, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is here.

Why is Max Boot's op-ed inferior? Because it is glaringly inaccurate, shallow in analysis, and betrays a significant lack of knowledge of the subject matter. Unlike Binnendijk, who has extensive experience in national security policy and a Ph. D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Max Boot is, well, a journalist with zero policy experience but possessing a flair for writing and an interest in security issues. To use a football metaphor, Binnendijk is a player and Boot is a cheerleader. Who do you think is going to write a more informed football op-ed?

Lamentably, Boot's lack of experience has not prevented him from becoming an influential voice in some policy circles, thanks to his former perch at the Wall Street Journal and the rise of neoconservativism. This is a shame. People with such limited knowledge should not be so influential. In my next post I will comment on Boot's op-ed in detail.

An Opportunity Wasted in US-Cuba Relations

Following US-Cuban affairs after Fidel Castro's incapacitation is kind of like watching a tennis match. On the left side of the court, sporting olive drab green shorts and matching headband, Raul Castro. On the right side of the court, wearing denim shorts and a cowboy hat, George W. Bush.

First, the serve. When Raul took over as Interim President there was much speculation from policy wonks and the press regarding the fate of US-Cuba relations. The ball is now in play and Bush is the first to return it over the net. Sensibly, US government officials quickly tried to extinguish such speculation by stating, in effect, that US policy opposes dictatorship in Cuba regardless if it is wielded by Fidel or Raul.

Cuba answers. In a major speech on July 26, Raul concedes that some of the Cuban government's past policies have failed and it appears that he is offering a small olive branch to the US. The ball, now back in the US side of the net, is answered with a strong back hand by President Bush. On Wednesday, in a major Cuban policy speech given from the State Department, President Bush maintains the hard line by indicating the embargo will remain in place and calling Cuba a "tropical gulag." Nice.

But wait.... What's this? Raul runs to the net and volleys. Just hours after Bush's speech, Cuba broadcasts half of it on national TV! And Granma, the Cuban government's newspaper, publishes edited transcripts that included some of Bush's best zingers (here is a copy of the speech with the text not published by Granma crossed out). Unprecedented.

The US now stumbles. According to the Miami Herald, Department of State officials declined to comment on the Cuban broadcast and release of transcripts of Bush's speech. To be fair, what could they say? Surely they can't encourage such hopeful behavior by the Cuban regime. To do so would be a slippery slope for this administration. At worst it may lead to the beginning of a thaw in relations between the two governments, at best it gives the appearance that the Bush hard line is softening. Either result will only open Bush to attacks from his base and serve to alienate the Cuba policy hawks that he so openly aligned himself with during the speech.

Gut check time. Just as the ball appears to be heading towards it's second bounce on Bush's court, the Administration reaches back and slams it towards the opponent. On Monday, President Bush awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to a jailed Cuban dissident, Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. Match point. Take your olive branch and shove it.

The next set in this match will start in 2009, when the US is under new management.

(Editorial Note: Here's hoping that Dr. Biscet's medal brings some luster back to the award. The medal was disgraced when, in 2004, it was presented to Paul Bremmer, Gen. Tommy Franks, and George Tenet--three of the four people most responsible for the debacle in Iraq).

More on Anthropologists and War

Sorry for the long absence. This weekend the NYT published an op-ed by an anthropologist who takes the view that his profession's backlash against helping the military in Iraq and Afghanistan is short-sided. His common-sense position is that anthropologists working for the military are not identifying who soldiers should kill or imprison but are instead providing high-speed cultural awareness training to the troops. Nothing earth shattering here as all of this is backed by the few accounts emerging from anthropologists in the theaters of war.


The op-ed further argues that working with the military is good for the profession because it opens doors that would allow it to become increasingly relevant in policy making. Yes.

Another Short Break

Well, last week was exceedingly hectic at work and it left me with little energy to blog. This week is a little better, but my time in front of the computer at nights will be limited. So, I will take another short break from blogging and hope to re-engage next week.

People That Don't Deserve Respect

Six years after 18 American soldiers and anywhere from 700 to 1,500 Somalis were killed in a running battle in the streets of Mogadishu, I was sitting in a graduate classroom listening to a professor talk about national security policy and the conduct of war. One of my classmates was a US Army Lieutenant Colonel who, during that fateful day in Mogadishu, October 3, 1993, was the battalion operations officer for the 3rd Ranger Battalion, one of the principal units involved in that fight.

In response to a question from the professor about the Battle of Mogadishu, this young LTC said, regretfully, "we didn't know what made the Somalis tick. We didn't know their culture."

What he was referring to was his unit's lack of "cultural intelligence" of Somalis. Had he understood their culture maybe he could have figured out ways to achieve his military objective without further deteriorating an already unstable situation. But because he lacked that cultural intelligence, the Rangers' mission in Somalia floundered for several months and reached its nadir in an 18 hour firefight that left thousands dead and many more wounded.

The role of "cultural intelligence" in warfighting has been on my mind ever since the defunct Arms Control Otaku pointed me to this blog by an anthropologist working with Army forces in Iraq. When I was an undergraduate I was keenly interested in anthropology and was, briefly, an anthropology major. Over the years I retained my interest in the field and was delighted to learn that the US military was going to incorporate anthropology in its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in a program called the Human Terrain System.

This is indeed great news because the skills and knowledge that anthropology will bring to the counterinsurgency table is expected to result in more intelligent application of military force and this will translate into less violence and a smarter approach to winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis and Afghans. In the end it will save lives, both American and Iraqi/Afghan, because it will embed "cultural intelligence" into the operations of military units. My old classmate's lament of not knowing "what made them tick" will hopefully now be a thing of the past.

Only an asshole would oppose this, no? I mean, who would want to deny the military this important tool that could lessen deaths and violence in war zones? Who would want to perpetuate the misery that Iraqis and Afghans are living in? Who wants to see more displaced Iraqis? More families shattered by the deaths of fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, husbands, and wives? Well, it turns out anthropology is full of selfish assholes. Here's a quote from one of them, in a comment to a post in the Savage Minds blog:

One shouldn’t be discussing how to interrogate detainees; one should be discussing how to help detainees get free of detention. Likewise, anthropologists shouldn’t be working with the military; they should be working with Iraqis, Afghanis, and especially insurgents, to inform them ‘of’ the military. Isn’t this the obvious corollary to the pledge against assisting the counter-insurgency – namely, to support the insurgency itself? (And what prevents the public articulation of this support? A secret fear of detention, perhaps?) And this, in my opinion, is where the discussion should turn: how can anthropologists, or anyone for that matter, help the insurgents?

As far as I can tell there are three reasons why anthropologists turned out to be such assholes. First, they have a Code of Ethics that forbids them from harming the populations they study. Second, the field is dominated by Lefties of the highest order, those with a rigid intellect that equate working with the American military with supporting an "illegal war" and American "imperialism." (disclaimer: I really don't know the percentage of "lefties" working in the anthropology field, but I suspect there's a lot of them because of the preponderance of lefty comments I read from anthropologists and because they are mostly all academics).

These two reasons--the Code of Ethics and the Lefties--are intertwined. Their rigid intellect does not allow them to differentiate between doing good and doing bad in a combat operations. Their default assumption is that if you work with the military you are basically drafting hit lists and assassination orders and, thus, violating a professional Code of Ethics. In fact, anthropologists participating in the Human Terrain System are doing no such thing. Here's what anthropologist Marcus Griffin is doing in Iraq:

One example is assessing the impact of poor essential services such as sewage, water, electricity, and trash on the population’s willingness to provide aid and comfort to insurgents. Improve the quality of life of local residents by building their satisfaction with the Iraqi Government and they will likely be less willing to harbor insurgents. If they are denied comfort, they have less ability to fight. Less ability to fight means fewer bullets get shot and fewer bombs get dropped.

Read this NYT article for an example of what another anthropologist is doing in Afghanistan.

The third reason some anthropologists are pissed is concern that an association with the military will make their work more difficult. There may be some validity to this, but really, screw them. So, their work might become more difficult? Boo-hoo. Cry me a river. We are talking about saving lives and easing violence in war-torn countries for God's sake! Assholes.

Oh, and God forbid they provide a service to their country. A nation that has provided them the opportunity to get their Ph.D.s and sit in their precious Ivory Towers looking down their noses at all other Americans concerned with making things better in Iraq. Let them not get their prissy hands dirty trying to help their country solve a difficult problem that is killing thousands of American and Iraqi youths. Fucking Assholes.

Short Break

A confluence of events prevents me from bloging this week. Hope to get back in the saddle next week.

PW Singer's Hair is on Fire: On Blackwater and Private Military Companies

A Salon.com article by PW Singer on the problem of Private Military Companies such as Blackwater forced my hand. I had been meaning to blog about this topic since news of the Sept. 16 incident involving Blackwater came to light. The article provided the prompting I needed.

Let me say at the outset that the article was very good and I generally agree with his main point--the US Government has a significant dependence on private contractors--and some of his more minor points, like the inherent conflict between the motivations of private contractors and the mission of the armed forces in Iraq. But Singer lacks nuance, his analysis is incomplete, and his conclusions are shaky.

One example is this paragraph:

When we evaluate the facts, the use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped, the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq, going against our best doctrine and undermining critical efforts of our troops. Even worse, the government can no longer carry out one of its most basic core missions: to fight and win the nation's wars. Instead, the massive outsourcing of military operations has created a dependency on private firms like Blackwater that has given rise to dangerous vulnerabilities.

Private military contractors have harmed some counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. This is quite different than what Singer suggests. The real culprits here are not the contractors but the US Government and US Military leadership, largely because they failed to develop an adequate counterinsurgency strategy until just this year--four years into the war! Blaming military contractors for the counterinsurgency problems in Iraq is just misplaced blame.

Further, private military contractors have helped the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq significantly because, quite frankly, there are not enough forces to do everything that needs to be done. If you think the war is going bad now, you could only imagine how bad it would be if there were no military contractors in Iraq.

Who would transport military supplies around Iraq? Who would train Iraqi units? Who would translate for line units conducting patrols? How would our intelligence agencies get enough interrogators and analysts? How would our diplomats, spies, and other non-military US Government personnel travel around the country if they didn't have contractor-provided security?

To do all of these things without military contractors means that US military forces would have to take on these missions in much greater capacities than what they do know. This means that there would be fewer forces to do the core mission: clearing neighborhoods of insurgents and terrorists, holding the neighborhoods until Iraqi forces can relieve US forces, and moving on to the next neighborhood.

Admittedly, contractors like some Blackwater operators have not helped the hearts and minds campaign in some areas of Iraq. This was evident to me when I was over there and I witnessed first hand some of their very aggressive tactics. They are also a pain in the ass of military commanders who are responsible for areas in which Blackwater operates, but they also provide valuable services that need to be done. Singer, it seems, recognizes this without admitting it when he talks of government dependency on private military contractors.

There are other parts of his article that are off base, such the whole "Abrams Doctrine" discussion (irrelevant because different force structures of the post-Vietnam and the present-day Armies make this "doctrine" unworkable), his callousness when talking about contractor deaths, and his persistent insinuations that military contractors are somehow to blame for the lack of counterinsurgency success.

Here's one paragraph indicative of Singer's misplaced blame:

Basically, the bigger the bases, the more fast-food franchises, the more salsa dance lessons -- and the more money the firms make, while wrapping themselves in the flag. But while bigger bases may yield more money for stockholders, they disconnect a force from the local populace and send a message of a long-term occupation, both major negatives in a counterinsurgency. Moreover, it puts more convoys on the roads, angering the Iraqis and creating more potential targets for insurgents. "It's misguided luxury ... Somebody's risking their life to deliver that luxury," Hammes says, adding, "Fewer vehicles on the road creates less tension with the locals, because they get tired of these high-speed convoys running them off the road."

In this passage Singer correctly diagnoses the counterinsurgency problem of big bases (disconnect the force from the local populace...message of long-term occupation), but he conveniently ignores that such issues associated with military basing are strategic and lay solely within the domain of military planners. Thus, this problem is exclusively the fault of the US military and civilian leaders, not the contractors. The contractors will build and sustain to the contract specifications. It's up to the military to decide how big and how secure and how comfortable they want the bases to be.

Here's another similar passage:

The formula for failure isn't hard to calculate. An Iraqi is driving in Baghdad, on his way to work. A convoy of black-tinted SUVs comes down the highway at him, driving in his lane, but in the wrong direction. They are honking their horns at the oncoming traffic and firing machine gun bursts into the road, in front of any vehicle that gets too close. The Iraqi veers to the side of the road. As the SUVs drive by, Western-looking men in sunglasses point machine guns at him. Over the course of the day, that Iraqi civilian might tell X people about how "the Americans almost killed me today, and all I was doing was trying to get to work." Y is the number of other people that convoy ran off the road on its run that day. Z is the number of convoys in Iraq that day. Multiply X times Y times Z times 365, and you have the mathematical equation of how to lose a counterinsurgency within a year.

Again, there are many ways to lose a counterinsurgency and while the aggressive driving techniques do contribute to ill feelings towards Americans this is hardly the reason why we would lose a counterinsurgency (disclaimer: I have ridden in convoys that employed very aggressive driving tactics, but our security personnel doing the driving where Iraqis, not Americans). Some better reasons would be the failure to establish security immediately following the fall of Baghdad, or the failure to secure the borders, or the disbanding of the Iraqi military, or the piss-poor post-conflict planning.

One of the things I was worried about when the shooting incident happened was that military contractors were going to be scapegoated. Blackwater is, in fact, the perfect scapegoat. Not only are they offensively aggressive and have a cowboy reputation, they also afford the Iraqi government and the US military an opportunity to deflect the spotlight for the quagmire that is Iraq. I am not defending their aggressive tactics and, as I stated earlier, I believe that they have been bad for some aspects of our fight in Iraq, but they should not be thrown under the bus either.

While the military contractors should be held accountable for crimes and civilian deaths, ultimate blame for the consequences of the use of contractors falls upon the US Government. The downsizing of the military following Desert Storm and maintained by the Clinton and Bush administrations left the Services and bureaucracies little choice but to use contractors in virtually every capacity. At the same time, the government also failed to develop clear policies, regulations, and laws to manage and control the activities of the contractors, resulting the gray area in which they now operate.

Exploring Iran's Intent in Latin America: A Theory

With Ahmadinejad's visit to Bolivia last week, Iran began to exploit a foothold it gained in Latin America. This foothold was provided largely by Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, who sees in Iran not only a comrade in his quixotic crusade against the United States, but also a source of inspiration in matters of defiance and defense.

For Iran, Venezuela's adoration is not reciprocal. It's my sense that Iran's interests in Latin America have more to do with not being isolated than with any bilateral relation it may have in the region. This means that its relations with Venezuela or Bolivia or any other country in the region are not as important as simply having those close relations.

This is a time when Iran is facing increasing international pressure over it's covert nuclear weapons program. Its long-time friends in the UN Security Council, Russia and China, have already expressed their displeasure with Iran. Indeed, Russia has even withheld cooperation on a previously-signed nuclear agreement (one that initially had nothing to do with the current nuclear standoff). France, a country that resisted resisting Iran, has now become, with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy, a friend of the US position and one of the more vociferous countries in the anti-Iran coalition-of-the-willing. And while US operations in Afghanistan and Iran have unfettered Iran geopolitically, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt are now more attuned than ever to a perceived threat from Tehran. No doubt a perception encouraged by the American sale of $20 billion dollars worth of arms to many of those countries; an attempt to lay the groundwork for a bulwark against potential Iranian temptations, such as the peninsula's oil fields or a Shi'a dominance.

And even in international finance, Iran is feeling the pinch.

With international isolation increasing, Iran is looking to Chavez to deliver like minded countries and help create a coalition-of-the-defiant, as it were. The principle aim for Tehran is to cultivate UN General Assembly votes in opposition to the nuclear nonproliferation interests of the US and its allies. Bolivia is the first stop. Next on Ahmadinejad's geopolitical itinerary is Nicaragua and, possibly, Ecuador. These countries may be a little bit harder to sell as their leaders have demonstrated less reactionary anti-Americanism than Bolivia's Morales, but be certain that Chavez will lean on them heavily

Of course, it's too soon to tell if Iran's strategy will bear fruit. I doubt it, but if nothing else, it will certainly be interesting to watch future developments.

Even More on Evo on the Daily Show

As usual, I'm a little late to the party (it's what not being able to blog until the end of a long day does to me). Evo appeared on the Daily Show on Tuesday and it's just about all the craze in the Bolivian-American blogosphere these days. All of the blogs I like to visit, Pronto*, MABB, Boz, Gringo Tambo, and others, have covered it.

I provided my two cents to some friends and family earlier today and I thought I'd just get to the botoom line now: Evo did well but thank goodness John Stewart is a comedian and not a real journalist. Otherwise, things could have gotten ugly.

Bolivia and Iran to Initiate Diplomatic Relations (Updated)

Apropos the post below, it appears that Ahmedinejad is now going to go to Bolivia on Thursday. La Razon reports that he will be bearing gifts too: the initiation of diplomatic relations with La Paz and the strengthening of commercial ties. Again, I just don't see what's in this for Bolivia.

Update: Ahmadinejad arrived in Bolivia this afternoon and already the newspapers are fretting over how this will affect US-Bolivian relations. In this post, Bolivian blogger Mario Duran provides a glimpse into the status of Bolivian civil liberties in Evo's democracy. Why is it relevant? Because it happend while he waited for Ahmadinejad's motorcade to pass.

The Mystery of Bolivia-Iran Relations

I don't get Evo Morales. I mean, I understand that he is knee-jerk anti-American and has a man-crush on Hugo Chavez, but I don't get why he is so careless at times. So seemingly myopic.
Case in point: Iran. Iran is a country that has managed to piss-off the Americans, Europeans, most Middle Eastern countries, and even the Russians and the Chinese. It is a country that kidnaps, for what else would you call it, innocent expats that return home for a visit with the family. A country the US claims, with justification, is actively supporting combat operations against US troops in Iraq and NATO troops in Afghanistan. A country that is known to support terrorists organizations such as Hezbollah. A country whose leader has expressed the wish that Israel should be wiped off the map. A country that is pursuing a nuclear weapons program and is in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. A country that has such bad relations with the US that many observers around the world are already beating war drums.

For Bolivia, this last point is particularly important. The US is the second most important market for Bolivian exports (behind Brazil) as well as a significant source of foreign assistance. Just as Venezuela is Bolivia's political and ideological patrón, the US is a major component of Bolivia's economic lifeline. US-Bolivian relations may not be at their most enlightened right now, but Bolivia is still significantly dependent on the US. Witness Alvaro Garcia Linera's recent visit to the US, lobbying for an extension of trade preferences.

Given the dynamics of the US-Bolivian relationship, why would the Bolivian government be cozying up to Iran at this particular time and run the risk of further eroding its relationship with the United States? One potential "benefit" for Bolivia could be further cementing its relationship with Venezuela (as there is no tangible benefit that a relationship with Iran can provide that will not be off-set by a break in US-Bolivia relations). But what can Iran do for Bolivia? Neither Iranian military nor political support count for much given Venezuela's competing influence (as well as the Chinese influence in the arms arena). Sure, Bolivia can talk about Iranian investment in Bolivian energy, but Iran is not the only country that is willing to do this.

It seems, then, that Bolivia is doing this only for the benefit of Venezuela (because Chavez's stock rises in the eyes of Ahmedinejad if Venezuela is able to "deliver" countries to Iran). Worse, not only does Bolivia not gain anything, its own interests are held at significant risk because, whether it wants to admit it or not, Bolivia needs the US to stay at least economically engaged. The US is not going to break relations over any one issue, but an accumulation of "issues" may drive the US to take a harder stance and that can only be bad for Bolivia. I don't see how Bolivia "wins" in this scenario, particularly given the dangers of further isolating the US. It's just poor statecraft.

Vigilantism in Guatemala

Yesterday, Reuters came out with an article on vigilantism in Guatemala, a consequence of the on-going gang problem. This is not the first report of it kind. There have been similar reports focused on other countries in Central America. El Salvador comes to mind (though I can't locate that article).

The gang problem in Central America does not get the type of serious attention and consideration it deserves. It is a slow-motion train wreck with significant implications for human rights, governability, democracy, and to some degree, even US security. Whatever gains have been made since the end of the wars in Central America, they are threatened by the gang crisis. Vigilante groups could easily evolve to into gangs. Police can easily be, and have been, involved in extrajudicial killings. Impunity can be rampant. In nearly all of these countries the military is operating in "support" of police forces, without adequate legal authorities, command and control mechanisms, and competent judicial structures. This is bad juju and it does not take much imagination for this scenario to spiral into failing state category.

Bolivian Army's Evolving Mission

Two articles came out in La Razon yesterday and today dealing with the Bolivian Army's elite baking unit, the 44th Regimental Baking Company. Just kidding, that's not the name of the unit. And the Bolivian Army doesn't have an elite baking unit. Not yet. (sidebar: boy, La Razon is really a good paper to get information dealing with Bolivian security forces. You'll notice I cite them aplenty) .

Anyway, these are a good set of articles to discuss the role of the armed forces in society. According to the articles, Evo Morales presented the Army with a "gift" of some industrial ovens and now the Service has a new mission, to make bread for the surrounding community. The concept, apparently, is that the Army will bake the bread and sell it at a reduced cost to citizens. There is some debate over details, such as should the bread be primarily for the consumption of the Army and only the surplus sold to civilians or should enough bread be made to feed the Army and sell to the civilians, but it seems clear that the future for some Army units means baking bread for the surrounding population.

Though it seems silly on the face of it, in fact this is not necessarily a bad use, if inefficient, of Bolivia's armed forces. Unlike militaries in developed countries, militaries in underdeveloped countries like Bolivia are already being used in to supporting civilian infrastructure. For example, in Bolivia the Air Force already operates commercial flights to the interior. In other countries, such as Armenia, Army garrisons make their health facilities available to townspeople. These types of "additional duties" are not necessarily bad and they do provide a valuable service to the country (though some "services" are more controversial than others, such as when the military provides school teachers, as has happened in Venezuela).

Of course, there are trade-offs. While these types of duties may aid the country in some ways, they can also hamper it in others and, as well, retard the capabilities of the military. In this case, the subsidised military bread will surely undercut some family-owned, small business bakeries. Of course, every time the military gets involved in commercial sales the possibility of graft and corruption are there. And if the business generates enough revenue, then effective civilian and democratic control of the military can also become an issue if not adequately controlled. On the other side of the coin, while the Army's bread may be cheaper for civilians, the cost to the government to produce the bread is likely significant in actual cost and in the opportunity cost associated with having soldiers baking and selling as opposed to training for combat or civil disturbance. And, let's be candid, Bolivia's armed forces need all the training they can get.

A related question, and one that is beyond the scope of this current post, gets at the shifting threat environment in Latin America and how this affects, or should affect, the roles and responsibilities of the region's militaries.

Bolivian MANPADS Redux

File this under It Could Be Nothing, But....

In 2005 the US rendered a bunch of Bolivian Chinese-made MANPADS inoperable. With the agreement of the Bolivian Armed Forces, the US took these weapons from their storage locations in Bolivia and flew them to the US for a quick snip-and-tuck. From the US perspective, in a post 9-11 world it wasn't a good idea to have poorly secured MANPADS floating around. And, given the lose Bolivian controls and porous borders, Bolivia seemed a likely candidate in which to implement this policy.

So imagine my surprise when I saw this article reporting that, in Brazil, between April 2005 and July 2007, Brazilian cops confiscated 9 "anti-air" weapons (armas antiaéreas) with the Bolivian Coat of Arms stamped on them.

Obviously, this means that the Bolivian Army or Ministry of Defense officials are selling weapons. I get that. Not a big surprise. But what I don't understand is what the heck are "armas antiaéreas"? That sounds like air defense weapons to me, but could they be...MANPADS? What other kinds of "armas antiaéreas" could they be talking about? They surely can't be talking about anti-aircraft guns, I can't imagine those suckers being dragged through the jungle (with due respect to the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu and the North Vietnamese Army at Khe Sanh--at least those guys were fighting a war).

Does this mean that the US missed some MANPADS? Or that they new of the leakage and that is what prompted the US to act in Bolivia? Of course, the article could be just plain wrong. It could be spin or an outright lie. Like I said, it could be nothing, but....

Smart Politics: US Certifies Bolivia in the Drug War

It appears that the US has certified Bolivia's fight against illicit drugs. In doing so, US aid to Bolivia will not be interrupted. Laying aside the monumental failure and waste of time that the US "war on drugs" has become, the Bush administration's decision to certify Bolivia is smart politics (and another example of why Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon is the right man at the right time). First, Bolivia is teetering on the edge of chaos and the last thing the US needs to do is insert itself in this combustible mix. A de-certification could have created a rallying cry for Evo's supporters and aggrieved nationalists and, undoubtedly, put some wind back in Evo's sails (at a time when, it appears, he is backing into a corner and could possibly make some concessions to the opposition). No need to push Bolivia into failed state status.

Also, a de-certification would have aided Chavez's cause more than ours. I know many proud Bolivians and Evo supporters like to pretend otherwise, but Evo is Chavez's puppet. There is very little free agency going on here. The US recognizes this and, in its policy, it *should* seek to drive a wedge between the two knuckleheads. The drug certification process does this by de-certifying Venezuela, but certifying Bolivia. A Bolivian de-certification would have validated, in Evo's and his supporters' eyes, the relationship with Chavez. It would have strengthened the Venezuela-Bolivia relationship and further weakened the US-Bolivia relationship.

Buyer Beware: Chavez Invests in Bolivian Security Forces

Interesting article in La Razón, today. Apparently the Bolivian police and the military are accusing each other of accepting Venezuelan aid.

General Wilfredo Vargas, Commander of the Armed Forces, denied that Venezuela provides assistance to the armed forces and asked that such questions be raised with the National Police.

The Inspector General of the National Police, Fernando Peláez, responded that his institution is not the one that received checks for forts, just equipment that will benefit the country’s citizens. (My translation)

In Bolivia there is long-standing enmity between the armed forces and the national police due to jealousies and mistrust over social status, funding, and a blurring of appropriate roles and missions caused by the war on drugs. In February 2003, the National Police mutinied in La Paz and the resulting rebellion saw military personnel engaging police in intense, if limited, firefights.

It is extremely unlikely that a police vs. military confrontation in the scale of the February 2003 rebellion will take place soon. But interesting to note how both institutions are playing this charade of “no, we don’t get aid from Venezuela” when, in fact, both organizations have received assistance from Chavez and will continue to do so.

So, what’s the story behind these denials? A couple of weeks ago Bolivia’s Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramon Quintana, denounced several social scientist types for working with USAID or on projects funded by USAID. Quintana allegedly called these people “vendepatria,” which is akin to being called a traitor. No one likes to be called a “vendepatria,” especially those whose jobs are to secure the patria.

But, in the interest of keeping things real, let’s recall this La Razon article from two weeks ago.

Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramon Quintana, confirmed yesterday that Venezuela directly deposits US$6 million into accounts opened by the Bolivian government for use by the military services to improve military infrastructure. (my translation)

The article goes on to say that in June the Army received US$5,491,462, the Navy US$1,181,000, and the Air Force US$771,395.

It’s official, Chavez is buying the country’s military. Who’s the vendepatria now?

Colombia shifts its eradication strategy

Last fall I attended a security cooperation conference sponsored by the National Defense University. One of the speakers was a Colombian government official who let it be known the Uribe government was investigating the possibility of shifting its drug eradication strategy from aerial spraying to manual eradication. Had I blog back then, I would have blogged about it as it is a significant development. Since that conference nearly one year ago, it appears that the Uribe government has made up its mind.

Colombia's vice president said Sunday that a U.S.-backed program to fumigate coca fields is failing to stem cocaine trafficking and called for anti-drug efforts to shift away from the practice. Vice President Francisco Santos' comments were Bogota's strongest critique yet of Washington's multibillion-dollar anti-narcotics strategy here, and came on the heels of a Senate vote to slash funding for the Colombian drug war.

"After a five-year frontal attack against drug trafficking, the results aren't the most successful or the ones we hoped for," Santos told a news conference.

Here’s the full article. In the interest of balance, let me address the anti-American slant in the quote above. As its underwriter, the United States does bear significant influence on Colombia’s drug eradication strategy. Without US assistance, it is unlikely that Colombia would have enough resources to both fight the insurgency and the drug trafficking. However, to lay the aerial spraying solely at the door of the US is problematic and intellectually dishonest. While the US has influence and funding, Colombia has veto power. It is their country. The aerial spraying may have been proposed by the US (or not, I really don’t know what the genesis of this is), but the Colombian government has always been an eager and willing participant.

I can speculate as to why aerial spraying was initially chosen as the eradication strategy of choice. First, starting up aerial spraying is cheaper than manual eradication. All you need is a few planes, a small crew, fuel, and herbicide. For manual eradicators you would need very many of them and they each would need to be trained, provided with uniforms and equipment, fed, and housed. The cost for all of this is significantly larger. Second, aerial spraying is more efficient. Whereas it would take a platoon of manual eradicators significant time to clear one field (whatever size) of illicit coca, presumably a couple of plane loads of herbicide could do the job in just a few swoops and the pilot can return to base in time for breakfast. Third, it is less violent than manual eradication since you avoid, to a much larger degree, direct conflict between the eradicators and the coca growers, traffickers, and guerrilla forces (which ever the case may be). Sure, there may be a plane crash or a shoot down here and there, but by and large, it is a significantly less violent form of eradication.

There are some downsides to this strategy, however, and these may have contributed to the decision to stop aerial spraying. First, aerial spraying is susceptible to countering tactics. In this case, coca growers developed an early warning system so that they had time to cover their crops while the plane was in-bound. This neutralized the herbicide as it never reached the coca leaves. Similarly, once the plane left, cultivators would immediately wash out the herbicide with buckets of water thereby limiting its effectiveness. Second, aerial spraying was effective when cultivators planted in open fields on hill sides. But cultivators quickly adapted and began planting inside national forests where the canopy limited somewhat the growth of their crops but also negated the government’s ability to spray. Also, if you really want to be sure a crop is eradicated, there is only way to do it: rip it from the soil, roots and all. In short, as the “enemy” adapted, aerial spraying reached its culmination point. It simply was no longer as effective as when it was first employed.

Coca eradication is a significant challenge. Ask the Bolivians. Given the risks associated with manual eradication, expect to see increased violence in the Colombian countryside and, as well, increased allegations of human rights violations. And also, much slower progress. On the plus side, maybe some of the demobilized paras can now be gainfully employed.

More Questions Than Answers

Latin News Daily is reporting that Peruvian officials arrested three Peruvian Army soldiers on suspicion of selling weapons to FARC guerrillas. The weapons were AK-47s and, reportedly, the FARC was willing to pay up to $3,800 per rifle. As the article points out, this is an unusually large sum of money for an AK (the soldiers ended up getting paid $800 per rifle, which is more reasonable if still a bit high). The article also notes that the large sum the FARC was willing to pay indicates they are having a hard time keeping their armories stocked.

I buy the argument that the high price is a matter of supply and demand, that's basic economics. But I wonder what is driving this phenomenon? Have Colombian military operations been successful in closing some supply lines? Or has Colombian diplomacy impacted the situation some how? Or both?

And another question. When Chavez announced he was going to purchase 100,000 AKs from Russia, many analysts suspected these rifles would end up in the hands of the FARC. Even if it wasn't Venezuelan state policy to provide the FARC with these weapons, went the theory, wouldn’t it be profitable for some Venezuelan commanders and government officials to sell them? Honestly, it's hard to argue with that logic.

But as far as I know, the 100,000 rifles have long ago arrived Venezuela. If the theory above is correct, why is there such a great demand by the FARC for these Peruvian rifles? Presumably, that demand would have been met by the Venezuelan surplus And if the surplus weapons didn’t go to the FARC, where are they? Are they destined for the new Venezuelan National Guard, rather than the Venezuelan military? Or are they part of Venezuelan security assistance to countries such as Bolivia?

Ja, ja!!!

As the old adage goes, people in glass houses shouldn't throw stones. Bolivian Interior Minister Juan Ramon Quintana is a former Bolivian Army officer. I believe he retired as a Major. After retirement he went into the defense and national security analysis bidness. In fact, he wrote an excellent book about the Bolivian Army's personnel system called Soldados y ciudadanos, about 10 years ago, or so. He also has extensive experience in foreign policy (used to be an advisor to the Foreign Affairs committee in the Casa de Deputados.

When Evo became prez, Quintana formed part of his cabinet and assumed his current position last year. It turned out that he is one of the more influential (so as not to say, "radical") members of Evo's cabinet. In particular, his vehement anti-American stand surprised me.

Two weeks ago, Minister Quintana flat out lied about USAID, claiming the aid organization sought to buttress opposition to Evo's government (ironically, just one day after the nation was paralyzed by significant work stoppages in 2/3 of the country, coincidence?). Quintana even spotlighted some prominent Bolivian social scientists who were working on projects funded by USAID. Well, it turns out that Minister Quintana has in the past benefited from US security assistance funding. La Razon has the write up. Juan, you hypocritical bastard.

Now, having said all that, there is room for discussion regarding what the purpose of US foreign assistance funds are for. As this issue with Quintana highlights, there is also ample room to discuss the potential unintended consequences of the foreign assistance reforms currently being implemented in the Department of State (the aptly-named, "F process").

Bolivia: Deepening Ties with Iran

Bolivian newspaper Los Tiempos reports on Minister of Foreign Affairs David Choquehuanca's visit to Iran and the signing of political and economic cooperation accords. According to the article, this is the culmination of reinvigorated Bolivian-Iranian relations. The process started when Ahmedinejad traveled to Latin America and met with Chavez, Morales, and Daniel Ortega.

While Choquehuanca was touring Iranian energy plants, Morales was accompanies by the Iranian Ambassador to Bolivia, Abdolah Zifan, during a visit to Cochabamba. Morales invited Iran to invest in Bolivia's energy sector and Ambassador Zifan invited Morales to visit Tehran. La Razon from La Paz has this coverage.

Bolivia: VP in US, But Where's the Quid Pro Quo?

Bolivian Vice president Alvaro Garcia Linera is in the US. He is here to try to persuade the US Congress to extend a trade preference act (the Andean Trade Preference and Drug Eradication Act--ATPDEA) that allows Bolivian goods, particularly textiles, to enter the US at significantly reduced tariffs. Said act was extended once already. Garcia's pitch is that whatever other issues there may be between Bolivia and the US, particularly Evo's big mouth, his closeness to Chavez, and his bad coca policies (in order of increasing concern to the US), they should not affect trade, which benefits both countries. Well, he is right on one count. Trade does benefit both countries. Whether Congress will continue to extend the trade preferences agreement while not receiving nothing in return is still up in the air.

This is tough call to make. On the one hand, it behooves the US to stay engaged in Bolivia and to maintain or protect a salvageable level of relations. On the other hand, Evo, for all the righteousness of his cause, is dismantling Bolivia's democracy piecemeal. In the long run, this will create only more instability in the country and in the region. Not a good scenario for the US, but there is very little the US can do to influence those types of governance decisions. But the US has more options when it comes to influencing other policies. The United States is Bolivia's most significant trade partner, shouldn't it use some of this influence to try to affect the course of, say, Bolivia's current coca policy? Or pressure a shift in Bolivia's increasingly warm relations with Iran?

Armenian Serendipity and Israel Loses Moral Authority

Last month, while browsing the collection of a used book store, I was drawn to a small book titled, Passage to Ararat, by Michael J. Arlen, about a man exploring his Armenian identity. I quickly picked up the book, as it resonated with me on two levels.

First, as someone who has read the subject of ethnic identity widely and given much thought to the issue, I was intrigued with Arlen's quest to find his own Armenian identity despite (or, because of) his late father's seeming indifference to it. Second, I had opportunities a couple of years ago to visit Armenia. During these trips I got a chance to travel widely in the country and talk to many Armenians. I quickly developed a fondness for the country, its people, and their rich heritage. Arlen's book piqued my interest as it gave me an opportunity to learn more about this fascinating country and its people.

Last week I finished reading Passage to Ararat. Arlen's exploration of Armenian history and its impact on modern the Armenian psyche was truly exceptional writing as well as enlightening reading. As circumstance would have it, just days after I finished reading the book I came across news that a small crisis was brewing between Israel, Turkey, and American Jewish interest groups, particularly the Anti-Defamation League. If you have no idea what the connection is between Armenia, Turkey, Israel, and the Anti-Defamation League, read this. If you are not inclined to read that, here's the Cliff's Notes version: Armenians claim that, in 1915, the Turks of the Ottoman Empire (the predecessor to today's Turkey), committed genocide against Armenians. Through the years, Turkey has steadfastly denied the charge of genocide. Fast forward to a couple of weeks ago, the Anti-Defamation League stated that the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in 1915 by the Ottoman Turks was "tantamount to genocide." This got the Turks in a hizzy and now Israel, so as to not endanger its ties with Muslim Turkey, is pressuring American Jewish groups to not recognize what happened to Armenians as a genocide. Ironic, huh?

Issues of identity abound in this conflict. If you ever read Passage to Ararat, and I hope you do, you will note the centrality of the Armenian genocide to modern Armenian identity. Even more central is a sense of Armenian "self-hate," to use Arlen's words, at the inability to prevent the genocide and, later, their inability to make Turkey acknowledge its role. Reportedly, anywhere from 1 to 2 million Armenians were systematically slaughtered in their Ottoman homeland (this is a significant number in absolute as well as relative terms, as there aren't that many Armenians to begin with--certainly not as many Armenians as there were Jews during WWII).

A much more well-known act of genocide is the Jewish Holocaust during WWII. And even as the Jews received some justice and had their day in court, this event too is a central theme in modern Jewish identity. Or is it?

The fact that Israel has made a deal with Turkey to deny the Armenian genocide speaks volumes to the fluid nature of identity. It also speaks to Israel's values. The Israeli State has become a genocide denier for political expediency. This is their right, and likely good politics, but I can't help feeling a sense of loss and disappointment. In my eyes, Israel can no longer claim the moral high-ground when it comes to the dark issues of genocide and ethnic cleansing.

Army Transformation

This article by conservative military historian Fred Kaplan landed in my in-box three times on Tuesday. It was sent to me by friends and colleagues and, needless to say, has very likely made the rounds in the Pentagon and other national security agencies already.

The article is well worth reading if you are into such matters as military innovation, institutional change, and the institutional effects of the war in Iraq on the U.S. Army. It is a well-written and thoughtful piece. In fact, the only critique I have on the article has nothing to do with anything Kagan writes but, instead, with a quote attributed to the Vice Chairman of the Army, Gen. Richard Cody.

Let me set the scene. In May, an Army Lieutenant Colonel wrote an excellent article decrying the performance of senior Army leadership (i.e., its Generals) in the conduct of the Iraq debacle. The article, A Failure in Generalship, was very widely read throughout the Army community. Two months later, General Cody finds himself in a room filled with Army Captains, fielding a series of questions that echo the complaints set out in the Generalship article. To whit:

In response to the captains’ questions, General Cody acknowledged, as
senior officers often do now, that the Iraq war was “mismanaged” in its first
phases. The original plan, he said, did not anticipate the disbanding of the
Iraqi Army, the disruption of oil production or the rise of an insurgency.
Still, he rejected the broader critique. “I think we’ve got great general
officers that are meeting tough demands,” he insisted. He railed instead at
politicians for cutting back the military in the 1990s. “Those are the
people who ought to be held accountable,” he said.

Here's the beef: Gen. Cody copped out with that answer. I happen to have worked for Gen. Cody at one point in my checkered career and I can say with some authority that Cody is known for being a straight talker. He's a no-bullshit kind of guy. So his answer above is surprising because it is a dive. Let me translate what he meant:

“I think we’ve got great general officers that are meeting tough demands." This means: I and the other general officers that lead the Army are doing a great job. We are not at fault. That article is wrong. Instead of being diplomatic, he should have been straightforward with his Captains. He should have acknowledged some of the shortcomings which, at this point, are clearly evident.

“Those are the people who ought to be held accountable.” This means: blame the civilians that were in office in the 1990s. Now, who where the civilians in office in the 1990s? Democrats. According to Cody, the poor state of the Army today is due to the Clinton Administration. What a crock.

During the Clinton administration there were significant troop and budget reductions as well as an increase in the Army's operation tempo (i.e. the number of times forces were deployed). This caused significant wining in the Army because it had to deal with increased deployments with lower troop levels (smaller force structure). This meant that there were too many deployments for the size of the force. But what Cody doesn't say, and how we now know Gen. Cody is a political hack, is that the troop reductions and budget cuts first happened under President George H.W. Bush immediately following Desert Storm. Further, had 9/11 not happened, idiot Rumsfeld would have cut the size of the Army even further (I think reducing it by two divisions was the going in assumption, if I recall) and used the savings to buy more airplanes and space technology.

Thus, to blame the policymakers of the 1990s is very disingenuous and smacks of political spin. Moreover, how reductions and mismanagement of the force in the 1990s impacts our current piss-poor performance in Iraq, is not clear. I think it's a leap of logic. Very disappointing. Yet another example of the failure of Generalship in the Army.

One more thing. The article alludes to the changes the Army underwent as a result of the Vietnam War. That war was a watershed event for the Army as an institution. Many of the most redeeming characteristics of the current institution, such as the degree of professionalization, was borne from the Army's experience during that war and immediately afterwards. (Even some of the not-so-redeeming characteristics, such as it's aversion to counter-insurgency, is a result of that war). The current war in Iraq will play a similar role in transforming the U.S. Army. The jury is still out on what the Army of the future will look like as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, but there are some fine line and field grade officers that definitely have an idea. The Young Turks of this generation.

W is getting hammered. In his speech at the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention this week Bush compared the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to all of America's wars since WWII. Most of the criticism is coming from this line:

Whatever your position is on that debate, one unmistakable legacy of Vietnam is
that the price of America's withdrawal was paid by millions of innocent citizens
whose agonies would add to our vocabulary new terms like "boat people,"
"re-education camps," and "killing fields."

The analogy, of course, is that withdrawing from Iraq will lead to disaster, the deaths of millions of innocent lives. I don't know what's going on in that White House, but I think they're cracking up over there.

America's biggest psychological hang up is the Vietnam War. That war was such a social and political catastrophe that to this day, 35 years after we pulled out of Vietnam, its spectre haunts every single foreign policy decision involving the use of military force. Even in the military, you can pretty much talk about a Vietnam and post-Vietnam force, particularly in the Army, as if the war and its effects on the Services were a demarcation line between states.

So back to Bush's speech. If you are an anti-war person, you pretty much want to link the conflict to the Vietnam War in any way possible. This will have provide your audience with an automatic, knee-jerk association: CAUTION, BAD, STAY AWAY. But if you are pro-war, then you want to stay as far away as possible from any Vietnam comparisons, no matter how trivial. Perhaps you can find a way to link your war to a "good one" like WWII. But definitely, don't touch Vietnam. I would think this is common sense. So, what the heck were Bush's press people thinking? Particularly now when some type of a withdrawal in 1998 is all but inevitable?

Baby Steps to Awareness

Excellent article on a frequently overlooked aspect of intelligence reform: the intelligence community's, particularly the CIA's, employment practices.

Mike McConnel, the director of national intelligence, echoed this theme
Tuesday in his remarks at the conference, in which he called for the hiring
of first-generation Americans. For years, he said, intelligence agencies
habitually screened out candidates born outside the country, fearing they
might be susceptible to foreign influences or blackmail if they had
relatives living abroad. "The rationale was, we couldn't bring them into
our midst -- there was too much risk," McConnell said. "We are going to
change those habits. It is now our policy across this community: We do not
screen out first-generation [Americans]."

As some of my close friends could attest to, this issue has been a big beef of mine for a long time now. There has been a few articles recently talking about the stupid hiring practices of the CIA. In effect, it is biased against Naturalized Citizens and first generation Americans as "foreign contacts" is a significant justification used to not hire otherwise excellently qualified candidates for Analysis or Operations. This de facto policy is the product of equal parts "cover your ass" bureaucracy, risk aversion, and paranoia. With a good helping of failure to understand and adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape. The end result: sacrifice improved access to hard targets and enhanced intelligence products on the off chance that we might hire a bad apple. Stupid, stupid, stupid.

McConnel has been a breath of fresh air in the IC. On this issue, as on the issue of interagency intelligence sharing, he is saying the right things. I wonder how long it will take for the bureaucracy to catch up with the vision. In the mean time, I will continue to recommend to any Naturalized Citizen or first generation American that asks about working in the intelligence field, don't even bother applying to the CIA.

Iraq Wins Asia Cup

Iraq 1 - Suadi Arabia 0.

Opportunities For Action?

Two recent articles regarding politics in Latin America are noteworthy. The first is this article in the Washington Post describing Raul Castro’s July 26 speech in Camaguey, Cuba; during which he apparently indicated he was willing to open the country to more foreign investment.

Speaking at a ceremony commemorating the start of the 54th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, Raúl Castro declared that Cuba is considering opening itself further to foreign investment, allowing business partners to provide this financially strapped nation with "capital, technology or markets."

The younger Castro's remarks, coupled with his unusual admission that the Cuban government needs to pay its vast cadres of state-employed workers more to cover basic needs, amounted to the clearest indication yet of how he might lead this island nation. Castro, who was named interim president last July 31, vowed to partner only with "serious entrepreneurs, upon well-defined legal bases."

...

But he also was careful to appeal to hard-line party leaders, saying that any new business deals must "preserve the role of the state and the predominance of socialist property" and that the government would be "careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past, [which] owed to naivete or our ignorance about these partnerships."

...

Castro condemned the United States for using "corn, soy and other food products" to produce fuel, saying prices for those food staples were sure to rise. But he also leveled withering criticism at his countrymen for "absurd inefficiencies" in food
production that force Cuba to import food and promised unspecified "structural
changes."

Before this speech, it was generally considered that, though incapacitated, Fidel retained significant influence because his “Fidelistas” retained positions of power in government. Raul Castro, of course, has his “Raulistas,” mostly military men that dominate the island’s security structures. The big questions after Fidel’s operation was whether these two factions would duke it out, how that fight was going to be conducted, and who was going to emerge winner. Of course, there was very little doubt that Raul was going to be the successor, but what was open to question was the degree of bureaucratic resistance or support to Raul’s rule.

Raul’s frank language during his speech, particularly his criticism of his brother’s failed policies, indicates that the Fidelistas may be coming around to Raul’s point of view. The article alludes to this scenario, to some degree of Raulista consolidation.

For the U.S. this is an opportunity to exploit the schism that exists between the Raulistas and the Fidelistas. While neither of these groups are democratic, the Raulistas appear to be the lesser of two evils. U.S. policy inaction over the last months could be understandable given the uncertainty over which faction was going to come out on top in Cuba. But as it appears that the Raulistas are emerging victorious, it may be time for the U.S. to offer incentives to encourage their development and help isolate the Fidelistas. The U.S. should change their overall approach of conditioning full relations with democratization, but flexibility could go a long way towards speeding up a transition.

The second is a Miami Herald article, here, describing the speech given by Venezuela’s departing Minister of Defense in which he appears to be criticizing some of Chavez’s policies. Here’s the relevant section form the article:

''We should invent socialism of the 21st century . . . but not in a chaotic or disorderly fashion,'' Baduel said at the ceremony. “Before we redistribute wealth, we have to create it. We can't redistribute what we don't have.''

Taking a jab at Chávez's control of all government branches, he added: ``It should be clear that a socialist production system is not incompatible with a profoundly democratic political system, with checks and balances and separation of powers.''

Baduel wound up his speech without uttering the new Cuban-inspired salute that Chávez has recently imposed on the armed forces -- ``Fatherland, socialism or death.''

On the assumption that the journalist covering this speech is doing an accurate job and the article accurately reflects what happened, there are two things one can surmise right away.

First, General Baduel has big balls to criticize Chavez’s polices in public while Chavez is sitting in the stage behind him. That is a courageous man.

Second, if the article is accurate, the speech is a sign that all is not well within Chavez’s security structures. Whatever ideological differences may exist (if any) between the President and his security structures, bureaucratic politics is likely the driving factor in any potential schism.

If one is to take Chavez’s defense reforms seriously, from the development of an asymmetric defense warfare strategy to the creation of a civilian militia to act as a “military” vanguard in case the U.S. invades Venezuela, the traditional primacy enjoyed by conventional military forces in Venezuela’s security structure is in question. As a result, proud men like Baduel, career military officers that are clearly devoted to their Service and their chosen profession, will form the core of bureaucratic resistance to some of Chavez’s policies.

In this scenario, improving U.S. military-to-military relations with the Venezuelan armed forces is a key to not only exploit this potential schism for information and intelligence but also to provide moral and other support to these types of officers. Of course, this is assuming that such officers would like support from the U.S.—admittedly, a dangerous assumption. Mil-to-mil relations with Venezuela have long been dormant. It’s perhaps time to attempt to reinvigorate this channel.

Futbol Is My Life

Iraqis love soccer. When I was in Baghdad I bought a soccer ball and organized pickup games inside our small compound. Between the Iraqi guards and soldiers, the Nepalese guards, and us Americans (usually just me), we could get enough people together to play up to 5 on 5. We couldn't play much more than that, we had a very small playing field due to the T-barriers and HESCO baskets, stacked two and even three high. The only other open area was just outside of the wire, next to the street; a football-sized field with a giant trench obstacle running the length of it to prevent car bombers from reaching our building.

So, we played in the courtyard, cramped between our building and the explosion barriers, on the hot cement. One Iraqi guard in particular stands out in my mind. He would strip out of his thick navy blue uniform pants, take off his socks and shoes, and play in his underwear, barefoot. On cement that had been cooking in 120 degree temperature. He was very good.

In one game another Iraqi guard sliced the ball of his bare foot. The huge gouge, I thought, merited some stitches. They drove him to the local clinic and three days later, he hobbled back to the courtyard after work, took off his shoes, wrapped his injured foot with duct tape, and began to play. When I told him he shouldn't play due to his injury he smiled at me and said "futbol is my life. If I can't play, no life!" He grinned, mussed up my hair and hobbled over to take his position in the field.

On another occasion I was woken up by my boss. "Get your stuff on," he said "there's some shit going on just outside." By the urgency and tone of his voice, I knew what he meant. I turned off the roaring a/c window unit that drowned out all noise outside and, sure enough, I could hear the cracking of single shots and the staccato of bursts. There was a big firefight going on. I grabbed my helmet, flack vest, and weapon and headed to the roof of the building to take up my firing position in between an American and a Nepalese guard. The night sky was lit up by tracers and the sound of gun fire was everywhere. It wasn't deafening, but we definitely had to speak up to get heard. Boss was on the sat phone several feet behind me talking to the TOC up the street when I heard him say, in disbelief, "okay." I turned to look at him as he turned off his phone. "Shit" he said. It turns out there was no fire fight that night. The Iraqi national soccer team had defeated Saudi Arabia. What we were hearing was celebratory gunfire.

News of car bombings in Iraq are so common that it is easy to not give it a second thought. I lived through a car bombing, back in June 18, 2004, and even I get "car bomb fatigue" with some of the news coverage. It is hard to describe the carnage caused by these weapons and even harder to describe the psychological effect, the heavy, oppressive atmosphere, the deep deep sadness, that these explosions generate--at least it did in me. But today's news of the twin bombings during street celebrations after the Iraqi national soccer team advanced to the finals of the Asia Cup--one bombing near the Monsour District, close to where I played my pick-up games, killed 30 people--brought everything back. I hope Iraq wins the final. It's against Saudi Arabia.

Gettin' Away With Torture

So, when juxtaposed against the traditional U.S. way of doing things, the news of the release of the 5 Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor from a Libyan jail is an interesting case study on the difficulty of dealing with rogues like Moammar Gadafi.

A quick recap: these poor folks voluntarily leave their families to go live in Lybia and dispense much-needed public health. These good Samaritans end up accussed of infecting hundreds of kids with HIV, are thrown in jail, face the death penalty, and are tortured--for EIGHT YEARS! Oh, never mind that the Libyan case against them is scientifically refuted by international experts.

Now, I know that we are supposed to not dislike Gaddafi too much nowadays since he gave up his WMD program, but really, the treatment received by these people is just as bad as that received by countless of political prisoners in Cuba, or China, or North Korea, or, when Saddam was in power, in Iraq.

Here's the juxtaposition: The U.S. shuns these types of powers. Our policy is, if they don't open their markets to us, we impose sanctions and beat them over their thick heads with human rights and democratization. And, as Barack Obama said recently, we are supposed to think that by not talking to these countries we are somehow punishing them. In the mean time, they get away with, literally, murder.

France and the EU, on the other hand, embarked on diplomacy, offered to pay Libya ranson...er...make concessions, and voila, the prisoners are finally freed. And the bad guys? Well, they get away with, literally, torture.

Moral of the story: there's no easy way to deal with rogues.

At Least Cuba Has Beaches

Okay, so next week we fly to beautiful Miami, Fl, for some well-deserved vacation. While I'm looking forward to seeing some friends and family, I know eventually the conversation is going to shift to the inevitable comparisons between Fidel Castro and Bolivia's Evo Morales. Some of my Cuban friends will say something like "So, how's Bolivia doing? You know, that's how Castro started...." And not wanting to be rude I'd say something like, "Yeah, Bolivia is going from bad to worse...."

But in fact, these comparisons to Fidel Castro drive me nuts. BOLIVIA IS NOT CUBA. While I'm no fan of dirty communists, there is good reason why Evo got elected. In Bolivia there is massive social inequality and, for all practical purposes, it is (or was) an apartheid-like state. Does any one really believe that South Africa under P.W. Botha did not deserve to change? These facile comparisons with Cuba ignore Bolivia's horrible social and political history and deny the great injustices that need to be addressed in order for the country to crawl it's way out of the bottom of the South American barrel.

Don't get me wrong, I'm no fan of Evo. I think that cheeky bastard is doing great harm to that country. What Bolivia needs is strong democratic institutions, not his slow but steady dismantling of them. While I sympathise with Morales's "social justice" argument and his desire to advance "indigenous" causes, I really believe that in the end he will do more harm than good because, after he is finished, Bolivia's will be as far away from democracy as, dare I say it, Cuba is now. I support Evo's social vision, but I lament the way he is going about it.

Givin' it a Whirl

We'll here I am. At first I resisted doing this blogging thing. I was of the impression that people who blog have to be pretty high on themselves to assume the rest of us care or are interested or even want to know their opinions. The gall. But I guess if you can't beat them, join them!

We'll see how it goes. I mainly wanted a tool to help me get some of my thoughts in order. I wonder if this will do the trick....