People That Don't Deserve Respect

Six years after 18 American soldiers and anywhere from 700 to 1,500 Somalis were killed in a running battle in the streets of Mogadishu, I was sitting in a graduate classroom listening to a professor talk about national security policy and the conduct of war. One of my classmates was a US Army Lieutenant Colonel who, during that fateful day in Mogadishu, October 3, 1993, was the battalion operations officer for the 3rd Ranger Battalion, one of the principal units involved in that fight.

In response to a question from the professor about the Battle of Mogadishu, this young LTC said, regretfully, "we didn't know what made the Somalis tick. We didn't know their culture."

What he was referring to was his unit's lack of "cultural intelligence" of Somalis. Had he understood their culture maybe he could have figured out ways to achieve his military objective without further deteriorating an already unstable situation. But because he lacked that cultural intelligence, the Rangers' mission in Somalia floundered for several months and reached its nadir in an 18 hour firefight that left thousands dead and many more wounded.

The role of "cultural intelligence" in warfighting has been on my mind ever since the defunct Arms Control Otaku pointed me to this blog by an anthropologist working with Army forces in Iraq. When I was an undergraduate I was keenly interested in anthropology and was, briefly, an anthropology major. Over the years I retained my interest in the field and was delighted to learn that the US military was going to incorporate anthropology in its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in a program called the Human Terrain System.

This is indeed great news because the skills and knowledge that anthropology will bring to the counterinsurgency table is expected to result in more intelligent application of military force and this will translate into less violence and a smarter approach to winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis and Afghans. In the end it will save lives, both American and Iraqi/Afghan, because it will embed "cultural intelligence" into the operations of military units. My old classmate's lament of not knowing "what made them tick" will hopefully now be a thing of the past.

Only an asshole would oppose this, no? I mean, who would want to deny the military this important tool that could lessen deaths and violence in war zones? Who would want to perpetuate the misery that Iraqis and Afghans are living in? Who wants to see more displaced Iraqis? More families shattered by the deaths of fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, husbands, and wives? Well, it turns out anthropology is full of selfish assholes. Here's a quote from one of them, in a comment to a post in the Savage Minds blog:

One shouldn’t be discussing how to interrogate detainees; one should be discussing how to help detainees get free of detention. Likewise, anthropologists shouldn’t be working with the military; they should be working with Iraqis, Afghanis, and especially insurgents, to inform them ‘of’ the military. Isn’t this the obvious corollary to the pledge against assisting the counter-insurgency – namely, to support the insurgency itself? (And what prevents the public articulation of this support? A secret fear of detention, perhaps?) And this, in my opinion, is where the discussion should turn: how can anthropologists, or anyone for that matter, help the insurgents?

As far as I can tell there are three reasons why anthropologists turned out to be such assholes. First, they have a Code of Ethics that forbids them from harming the populations they study. Second, the field is dominated by Lefties of the highest order, those with a rigid intellect that equate working with the American military with supporting an "illegal war" and American "imperialism." (disclaimer: I really don't know the percentage of "lefties" working in the anthropology field, but I suspect there's a lot of them because of the preponderance of lefty comments I read from anthropologists and because they are mostly all academics).

These two reasons--the Code of Ethics and the Lefties--are intertwined. Their rigid intellect does not allow them to differentiate between doing good and doing bad in a combat operations. Their default assumption is that if you work with the military you are basically drafting hit lists and assassination orders and, thus, violating a professional Code of Ethics. In fact, anthropologists participating in the Human Terrain System are doing no such thing. Here's what anthropologist Marcus Griffin is doing in Iraq:

One example is assessing the impact of poor essential services such as sewage, water, electricity, and trash on the population’s willingness to provide aid and comfort to insurgents. Improve the quality of life of local residents by building their satisfaction with the Iraqi Government and they will likely be less willing to harbor insurgents. If they are denied comfort, they have less ability to fight. Less ability to fight means fewer bullets get shot and fewer bombs get dropped.

Read this NYT article for an example of what another anthropologist is doing in Afghanistan.

The third reason some anthropologists are pissed is concern that an association with the military will make their work more difficult. There may be some validity to this, but really, screw them. So, their work might become more difficult? Boo-hoo. Cry me a river. We are talking about saving lives and easing violence in war-torn countries for God's sake! Assholes.

Oh, and God forbid they provide a service to their country. A nation that has provided them the opportunity to get their Ph.D.s and sit in their precious Ivory Towers looking down their noses at all other Americans concerned with making things better in Iraq. Let them not get their prissy hands dirty trying to help their country solve a difficult problem that is killing thousands of American and Iraqi youths. Fucking Assholes.

Short Break

A confluence of events prevents me from bloging this week. Hope to get back in the saddle next week.

PW Singer's Hair is on Fire: On Blackwater and Private Military Companies

A Salon.com article by PW Singer on the problem of Private Military Companies such as Blackwater forced my hand. I had been meaning to blog about this topic since news of the Sept. 16 incident involving Blackwater came to light. The article provided the prompting I needed.

Let me say at the outset that the article was very good and I generally agree with his main point--the US Government has a significant dependence on private contractors--and some of his more minor points, like the inherent conflict between the motivations of private contractors and the mission of the armed forces in Iraq. But Singer lacks nuance, his analysis is incomplete, and his conclusions are shaky.

One example is this paragraph:

When we evaluate the facts, the use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped, the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq, going against our best doctrine and undermining critical efforts of our troops. Even worse, the government can no longer carry out one of its most basic core missions: to fight and win the nation's wars. Instead, the massive outsourcing of military operations has created a dependency on private firms like Blackwater that has given rise to dangerous vulnerabilities.

Private military contractors have harmed some counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. This is quite different than what Singer suggests. The real culprits here are not the contractors but the US Government and US Military leadership, largely because they failed to develop an adequate counterinsurgency strategy until just this year--four years into the war! Blaming military contractors for the counterinsurgency problems in Iraq is just misplaced blame.

Further, private military contractors have helped the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq significantly because, quite frankly, there are not enough forces to do everything that needs to be done. If you think the war is going bad now, you could only imagine how bad it would be if there were no military contractors in Iraq.

Who would transport military supplies around Iraq? Who would train Iraqi units? Who would translate for line units conducting patrols? How would our intelligence agencies get enough interrogators and analysts? How would our diplomats, spies, and other non-military US Government personnel travel around the country if they didn't have contractor-provided security?

To do all of these things without military contractors means that US military forces would have to take on these missions in much greater capacities than what they do know. This means that there would be fewer forces to do the core mission: clearing neighborhoods of insurgents and terrorists, holding the neighborhoods until Iraqi forces can relieve US forces, and moving on to the next neighborhood.

Admittedly, contractors like some Blackwater operators have not helped the hearts and minds campaign in some areas of Iraq. This was evident to me when I was over there and I witnessed first hand some of their very aggressive tactics. They are also a pain in the ass of military commanders who are responsible for areas in which Blackwater operates, but they also provide valuable services that need to be done. Singer, it seems, recognizes this without admitting it when he talks of government dependency on private military contractors.

There are other parts of his article that are off base, such the whole "Abrams Doctrine" discussion (irrelevant because different force structures of the post-Vietnam and the present-day Armies make this "doctrine" unworkable), his callousness when talking about contractor deaths, and his persistent insinuations that military contractors are somehow to blame for the lack of counterinsurgency success.

Here's one paragraph indicative of Singer's misplaced blame:

Basically, the bigger the bases, the more fast-food franchises, the more salsa dance lessons -- and the more money the firms make, while wrapping themselves in the flag. But while bigger bases may yield more money for stockholders, they disconnect a force from the local populace and send a message of a long-term occupation, both major negatives in a counterinsurgency. Moreover, it puts more convoys on the roads, angering the Iraqis and creating more potential targets for insurgents. "It's misguided luxury ... Somebody's risking their life to deliver that luxury," Hammes says, adding, "Fewer vehicles on the road creates less tension with the locals, because they get tired of these high-speed convoys running them off the road."

In this passage Singer correctly diagnoses the counterinsurgency problem of big bases (disconnect the force from the local populace...message of long-term occupation), but he conveniently ignores that such issues associated with military basing are strategic and lay solely within the domain of military planners. Thus, this problem is exclusively the fault of the US military and civilian leaders, not the contractors. The contractors will build and sustain to the contract specifications. It's up to the military to decide how big and how secure and how comfortable they want the bases to be.

Here's another similar passage:

The formula for failure isn't hard to calculate. An Iraqi is driving in Baghdad, on his way to work. A convoy of black-tinted SUVs comes down the highway at him, driving in his lane, but in the wrong direction. They are honking their horns at the oncoming traffic and firing machine gun bursts into the road, in front of any vehicle that gets too close. The Iraqi veers to the side of the road. As the SUVs drive by, Western-looking men in sunglasses point machine guns at him. Over the course of the day, that Iraqi civilian might tell X people about how "the Americans almost killed me today, and all I was doing was trying to get to work." Y is the number of other people that convoy ran off the road on its run that day. Z is the number of convoys in Iraq that day. Multiply X times Y times Z times 365, and you have the mathematical equation of how to lose a counterinsurgency within a year.

Again, there are many ways to lose a counterinsurgency and while the aggressive driving techniques do contribute to ill feelings towards Americans this is hardly the reason why we would lose a counterinsurgency (disclaimer: I have ridden in convoys that employed very aggressive driving tactics, but our security personnel doing the driving where Iraqis, not Americans). Some better reasons would be the failure to establish security immediately following the fall of Baghdad, or the failure to secure the borders, or the disbanding of the Iraqi military, or the piss-poor post-conflict planning.

One of the things I was worried about when the shooting incident happened was that military contractors were going to be scapegoated. Blackwater is, in fact, the perfect scapegoat. Not only are they offensively aggressive and have a cowboy reputation, they also afford the Iraqi government and the US military an opportunity to deflect the spotlight for the quagmire that is Iraq. I am not defending their aggressive tactics and, as I stated earlier, I believe that they have been bad for some aspects of our fight in Iraq, but they should not be thrown under the bus either.

While the military contractors should be held accountable for crimes and civilian deaths, ultimate blame for the consequences of the use of contractors falls upon the US Government. The downsizing of the military following Desert Storm and maintained by the Clinton and Bush administrations left the Services and bureaucracies little choice but to use contractors in virtually every capacity. At the same time, the government also failed to develop clear policies, regulations, and laws to manage and control the activities of the contractors, resulting the gray area in which they now operate.

Exploring Iran's Intent in Latin America: A Theory

With Ahmadinejad's visit to Bolivia last week, Iran began to exploit a foothold it gained in Latin America. This foothold was provided largely by Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, who sees in Iran not only a comrade in his quixotic crusade against the United States, but also a source of inspiration in matters of defiance and defense.

For Iran, Venezuela's adoration is not reciprocal. It's my sense that Iran's interests in Latin America have more to do with not being isolated than with any bilateral relation it may have in the region. This means that its relations with Venezuela or Bolivia or any other country in the region are not as important as simply having those close relations.

This is a time when Iran is facing increasing international pressure over it's covert nuclear weapons program. Its long-time friends in the UN Security Council, Russia and China, have already expressed their displeasure with Iran. Indeed, Russia has even withheld cooperation on a previously-signed nuclear agreement (one that initially had nothing to do with the current nuclear standoff). France, a country that resisted resisting Iran, has now become, with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy, a friend of the US position and one of the more vociferous countries in the anti-Iran coalition-of-the-willing. And while US operations in Afghanistan and Iran have unfettered Iran geopolitically, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt are now more attuned than ever to a perceived threat from Tehran. No doubt a perception encouraged by the American sale of $20 billion dollars worth of arms to many of those countries; an attempt to lay the groundwork for a bulwark against potential Iranian temptations, such as the peninsula's oil fields or a Shi'a dominance.

And even in international finance, Iran is feeling the pinch.

With international isolation increasing, Iran is looking to Chavez to deliver like minded countries and help create a coalition-of-the-defiant, as it were. The principle aim for Tehran is to cultivate UN General Assembly votes in opposition to the nuclear nonproliferation interests of the US and its allies. Bolivia is the first stop. Next on Ahmadinejad's geopolitical itinerary is Nicaragua and, possibly, Ecuador. These countries may be a little bit harder to sell as their leaders have demonstrated less reactionary anti-Americanism than Bolivia's Morales, but be certain that Chavez will lean on them heavily

Of course, it's too soon to tell if Iran's strategy will bear fruit. I doubt it, but if nothing else, it will certainly be interesting to watch future developments.

Even More on Evo on the Daily Show

As usual, I'm a little late to the party (it's what not being able to blog until the end of a long day does to me). Evo appeared on the Daily Show on Tuesday and it's just about all the craze in the Bolivian-American blogosphere these days. All of the blogs I like to visit, Pronto*, MABB, Boz, Gringo Tambo, and others, have covered it.

I provided my two cents to some friends and family earlier today and I thought I'd just get to the botoom line now: Evo did well but thank goodness John Stewart is a comedian and not a real journalist. Otherwise, things could have gotten ugly.

Bolivia and Iran to Initiate Diplomatic Relations (Updated)

Apropos the post below, it appears that Ahmedinejad is now going to go to Bolivia on Thursday. La Razon reports that he will be bearing gifts too: the initiation of diplomatic relations with La Paz and the strengthening of commercial ties. Again, I just don't see what's in this for Bolivia.

Update: Ahmadinejad arrived in Bolivia this afternoon and already the newspapers are fretting over how this will affect US-Bolivian relations. In this post, Bolivian blogger Mario Duran provides a glimpse into the status of Bolivian civil liberties in Evo's democracy. Why is it relevant? Because it happend while he waited for Ahmadinejad's motorcade to pass.

The Mystery of Bolivia-Iran Relations

I don't get Evo Morales. I mean, I understand that he is knee-jerk anti-American and has a man-crush on Hugo Chavez, but I don't get why he is so careless at times. So seemingly myopic.
Case in point: Iran. Iran is a country that has managed to piss-off the Americans, Europeans, most Middle Eastern countries, and even the Russians and the Chinese. It is a country that kidnaps, for what else would you call it, innocent expats that return home for a visit with the family. A country the US claims, with justification, is actively supporting combat operations against US troops in Iraq and NATO troops in Afghanistan. A country that is known to support terrorists organizations such as Hezbollah. A country whose leader has expressed the wish that Israel should be wiped off the map. A country that is pursuing a nuclear weapons program and is in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. A country that has such bad relations with the US that many observers around the world are already beating war drums.

For Bolivia, this last point is particularly important. The US is the second most important market for Bolivian exports (behind Brazil) as well as a significant source of foreign assistance. Just as Venezuela is Bolivia's political and ideological patrón, the US is a major component of Bolivia's economic lifeline. US-Bolivian relations may not be at their most enlightened right now, but Bolivia is still significantly dependent on the US. Witness Alvaro Garcia Linera's recent visit to the US, lobbying for an extension of trade preferences.

Given the dynamics of the US-Bolivian relationship, why would the Bolivian government be cozying up to Iran at this particular time and run the risk of further eroding its relationship with the United States? One potential "benefit" for Bolivia could be further cementing its relationship with Venezuela (as there is no tangible benefit that a relationship with Iran can provide that will not be off-set by a break in US-Bolivia relations). But what can Iran do for Bolivia? Neither Iranian military nor political support count for much given Venezuela's competing influence (as well as the Chinese influence in the arms arena). Sure, Bolivia can talk about Iranian investment in Bolivian energy, but Iran is not the only country that is willing to do this.

It seems, then, that Bolivia is doing this only for the benefit of Venezuela (because Chavez's stock rises in the eyes of Ahmedinejad if Venezuela is able to "deliver" countries to Iran). Worse, not only does Bolivia not gain anything, its own interests are held at significant risk because, whether it wants to admit it or not, Bolivia needs the US to stay at least economically engaged. The US is not going to break relations over any one issue, but an accumulation of "issues" may drive the US to take a harder stance and that can only be bad for Bolivia. I don't see how Bolivia "wins" in this scenario, particularly given the dangers of further isolating the US. It's just poor statecraft.