In Bolivia the Military Chief Takes a Side

Yesterday the Bolivian Chief of the Armed Forces, General Wilfredo Vargas, the highest ranking military man in Bolivia, responded to calls for military intervention in the simmering social/political/regional crisis by calling opposition leaders "cowards."

The military should be congratulated for that stance, even though it may not be an altruistic position. In years past, the military would have likely been quick to storm the presidential palace and take over government, given the level of violence and insecurity in Bolivia. In the last 20 years or so, however, the concept of defending a democratic constitution vice an administration or political position has begun to taken hold within the military ethos, causing the armed forces to make careful calculations and second guess their instinct to act.

Of course, as opposition leaders suggest, the military leadership is being bribed into compliance, and undoubtedly this helps them toe the party line, but I can't help think that should the Evo administration make some egregious assault on democratic norms in Bolivia, the military would likely act no matter how much they are getting paid. After all, they have institutional interests at stake as well. Barring this, the military chiefs will stay quite with the $40K they are allegedly being paid and democracy will not so much be assaulted to death, but instead it will be a death by a thousand decrees.

Of course, this doesn't mean that there will not be a "Major's Revolt" in the future, since presumably the $40K is only going to the chiefs of the services and the booty is not being pushed down to other levels of command.

In Bolivia The Opposition Strikes Back

To the opposition in Bolivia, as well as to every objective thinking person around the world, it is hard to separate the events going on in Bolivia, and particularly the policies of Evo Morales, from the influence of Hugo Chavez. As I've said before, Chavez holds much sway with Evo. Immediately following Evo's inauguration, for example, Bolivia and Venezuela signed a series of bilateral agreements dealing with trade and energy cooperation. A bit later a military cooperation agreement was signed that provided legal cover for Venezuela to send, and Bolivia to receive, military forces engaged in training and infrastructure development.

Predictably, rumors of Venezuelan military support for purposes of maintaining the Morales government in power began to spread, aided by statements made by Chavez on more than one occasion. Opposition representatives have claimed that Venezuela is, in fact, illegally shipping arms to Bolivia. Today they should get a chance to prove it.

Yesterday, a mob in the city of Riberalta stormed the airport and threw stones at a Venezuelan Air Force C-130 transport plane that they believed to be carrying a shipment of arms. The mob assaulted one Venezuelan who deplaned and the pilots were eventually able to fly out of the airport.

Bolivian government authorities claimed the aircraft was only carrying spare parts and personnel on their way back to Caracas and the stop in Riberalta was not to unload supplies or weapons but simply to refuel.

After taking off from Riberalta the cargo plane tried landing in at least two other nearby airports but was deterred by the presence of more mobs. It finally flew to the Brazilian town of Rio Branco. Today a group of opposition leaders were to fly to the Brazilian town to investigate the cargo the plane was carrying. La Razon has the story here. Reuters has a report in English, here.

This event could be indicative of a shift in the opposition strategy. They are now trying to internationalize their fight.

Exhibit A: Previously they were content to make allegations against Venezuelan interference, maybe go as far as a protest in front of the Venezuelan Embassy, but never before, that I know, had they actually planed, organized, and executed an assault on what they suspected was a Venezuelan arms shipment. This is very symbolic. In effect, they assaulted the Venezuelan military.

Exhibit B: It is likely not a coincidence that this action was taken precisely when opposition leaders from the Media Luna departments where in Washington DC seeking support from the OAS and speaking in think tanks before American audiences.

Exhibit C: It comes at a time when Chavez's influence in the region is in a slight wane, following the King of Spain's public rebuke of him and on the heels of Chavez's first electoral defeat.

Regardless of what the plane holds in its cargo bay (and in this instance I believe the Bolivian Government), it is clear that the opposition means business. This event requires significant organizational capabilities to pull off.

Who Will Stand Up For Bolivian Democracy?

I know I promised a detailed critique of Max Boot's op-ed. I'm still working on it.... It's just got kind of long and unwieldy for a blog. Maybe if I break it down and post it as separate blog entries....

In the mean time, let's take a stroll through the two big news items in Latin America this past week.

The biggest item, by far, is that Chavez lost Sunday's constitutional referendum in Venezuela by the slimmest of margins, 51 to 49 percent. (If you don't know what I'm talking about...Chavez proposed major constitutional reforms that would have allowed him to serve unlimited terms as president and consolidate significant political, bureaucratic, and economic power. In short, this would have been the first step towards dictatorship in Venezuela). The defeat of his proposal is good news to defenders of democracy, bad news to lefties that would like to inflict on Venezuela a totalitarian "socialist" system. No doubt that as I type this, Chavez and his cronies are already plotting ways to overcome this set-back and forge ahead with plans to further consolidate power and continue in office past 2012, when Chavez's current term is supposed to expire. Four years can't come soon enough. The opposition in Venezuela should take advantage of this situation, come together, and build momentum to move forward.

One question regarding Chavez's defeat is how will this impact Evo's actions in Bolivia, the second news item of the week. MABB and Pronto have extensive coverage of the unfortunate developments in Bolivia since Thanksgiving, so I won't go into the details here. Bolivia now finds itself in a dangerous position, with the country and society polarized seemingly more than ever. So much so that the failure of the Bolivian state is now an issue should things continue with no amelioration. Evo is undoubtedly following the Chavez blueprint. Indeed, the Venezuelan President is probably the most influential advisor in the Casa Quemada and Evo's ill-conceived actions over the last week likely have Chavez's finger prints all over them. So what does Chavez's defeat on Sunday mean for Evo? Will he see Chavez's defeat and draw the conclusion that his constitutional reforms could meet a similar fate if he does not moderate his position and seek greater consensus? You would hope so.

Earlier this month it appeared the State Department was going to force a handful of Foreign Service Officers to serve their country in Iraq. There was much diplomatic hand-wringing in Foggy Bottom at the prospect. God forbid diplomats do their duty at a time and in a place their country needs them most. Though this "diplomatic crisis" has come to an end thanks to a few honorable volunteers, the ample news coverage the "revolt" received brought renewed attention to the difficulties the US Government is, nay has been, having coming to terms with the international threat environment ever since the end of the Cold War.

Two op-ed pieces on this very topic recently appeared in the Washington Post and the New York Times. The first and by far the best one is written by Hans Binnendijk, a professor at the National Defense University (here). The inferior op-ed, written by Max Boot, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is here.

Why is Max Boot's op-ed inferior? Because it is glaringly inaccurate, shallow in analysis, and betrays a significant lack of knowledge of the subject matter. Unlike Binnendijk, who has extensive experience in national security policy and a Ph. D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Max Boot is, well, a journalist with zero policy experience but possessing a flair for writing and an interest in security issues. To use a football metaphor, Binnendijk is a player and Boot is a cheerleader. Who do you think is going to write a more informed football op-ed?

Lamentably, Boot's lack of experience has not prevented him from becoming an influential voice in some policy circles, thanks to his former perch at the Wall Street Journal and the rise of neoconservativism. This is a shame. People with such limited knowledge should not be so influential. In my next post I will comment on Boot's op-ed in detail.

An Opportunity Wasted in US-Cuba Relations

Following US-Cuban affairs after Fidel Castro's incapacitation is kind of like watching a tennis match. On the left side of the court, sporting olive drab green shorts and matching headband, Raul Castro. On the right side of the court, wearing denim shorts and a cowboy hat, George W. Bush.

First, the serve. When Raul took over as Interim President there was much speculation from policy wonks and the press regarding the fate of US-Cuba relations. The ball is now in play and Bush is the first to return it over the net. Sensibly, US government officials quickly tried to extinguish such speculation by stating, in effect, that US policy opposes dictatorship in Cuba regardless if it is wielded by Fidel or Raul.

Cuba answers. In a major speech on July 26, Raul concedes that some of the Cuban government's past policies have failed and it appears that he is offering a small olive branch to the US. The ball, now back in the US side of the net, is answered with a strong back hand by President Bush. On Wednesday, in a major Cuban policy speech given from the State Department, President Bush maintains the hard line by indicating the embargo will remain in place and calling Cuba a "tropical gulag." Nice.

But wait.... What's this? Raul runs to the net and volleys. Just hours after Bush's speech, Cuba broadcasts half of it on national TV! And Granma, the Cuban government's newspaper, publishes edited transcripts that included some of Bush's best zingers (here is a copy of the speech with the text not published by Granma crossed out). Unprecedented.

The US now stumbles. According to the Miami Herald, Department of State officials declined to comment on the Cuban broadcast and release of transcripts of Bush's speech. To be fair, what could they say? Surely they can't encourage such hopeful behavior by the Cuban regime. To do so would be a slippery slope for this administration. At worst it may lead to the beginning of a thaw in relations between the two governments, at best it gives the appearance that the Bush hard line is softening. Either result will only open Bush to attacks from his base and serve to alienate the Cuba policy hawks that he so openly aligned himself with during the speech.

Gut check time. Just as the ball appears to be heading towards it's second bounce on Bush's court, the Administration reaches back and slams it towards the opponent. On Monday, President Bush awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to a jailed Cuban dissident, Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. Match point. Take your olive branch and shove it.

The next set in this match will start in 2009, when the US is under new management.

(Editorial Note: Here's hoping that Dr. Biscet's medal brings some luster back to the award. The medal was disgraced when, in 2004, it was presented to Paul Bremmer, Gen. Tommy Franks, and George Tenet--three of the four people most responsible for the debacle in Iraq).

More on Anthropologists and War

Sorry for the long absence. This weekend the NYT published an op-ed by an anthropologist who takes the view that his profession's backlash against helping the military in Iraq and Afghanistan is short-sided. His common-sense position is that anthropologists working for the military are not identifying who soldiers should kill or imprison but are instead providing high-speed cultural awareness training to the troops. Nothing earth shattering here as all of this is backed by the few accounts emerging from anthropologists in the theaters of war.


The op-ed further argues that working with the military is good for the profession because it opens doors that would allow it to become increasingly relevant in policy making. Yes.

Another Short Break

Well, last week was exceedingly hectic at work and it left me with little energy to blog. This week is a little better, but my time in front of the computer at nights will be limited. So, I will take another short break from blogging and hope to re-engage next week.

People That Don't Deserve Respect

Six years after 18 American soldiers and anywhere from 700 to 1,500 Somalis were killed in a running battle in the streets of Mogadishu, I was sitting in a graduate classroom listening to a professor talk about national security policy and the conduct of war. One of my classmates was a US Army Lieutenant Colonel who, during that fateful day in Mogadishu, October 3, 1993, was the battalion operations officer for the 3rd Ranger Battalion, one of the principal units involved in that fight.

In response to a question from the professor about the Battle of Mogadishu, this young LTC said, regretfully, "we didn't know what made the Somalis tick. We didn't know their culture."

What he was referring to was his unit's lack of "cultural intelligence" of Somalis. Had he understood their culture maybe he could have figured out ways to achieve his military objective without further deteriorating an already unstable situation. But because he lacked that cultural intelligence, the Rangers' mission in Somalia floundered for several months and reached its nadir in an 18 hour firefight that left thousands dead and many more wounded.

The role of "cultural intelligence" in warfighting has been on my mind ever since the defunct Arms Control Otaku pointed me to this blog by an anthropologist working with Army forces in Iraq. When I was an undergraduate I was keenly interested in anthropology and was, briefly, an anthropology major. Over the years I retained my interest in the field and was delighted to learn that the US military was going to incorporate anthropology in its operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in a program called the Human Terrain System.

This is indeed great news because the skills and knowledge that anthropology will bring to the counterinsurgency table is expected to result in more intelligent application of military force and this will translate into less violence and a smarter approach to winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis and Afghans. In the end it will save lives, both American and Iraqi/Afghan, because it will embed "cultural intelligence" into the operations of military units. My old classmate's lament of not knowing "what made them tick" will hopefully now be a thing of the past.

Only an asshole would oppose this, no? I mean, who would want to deny the military this important tool that could lessen deaths and violence in war zones? Who would want to perpetuate the misery that Iraqis and Afghans are living in? Who wants to see more displaced Iraqis? More families shattered by the deaths of fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, husbands, and wives? Well, it turns out anthropology is full of selfish assholes. Here's a quote from one of them, in a comment to a post in the Savage Minds blog:

One shouldn’t be discussing how to interrogate detainees; one should be discussing how to help detainees get free of detention. Likewise, anthropologists shouldn’t be working with the military; they should be working with Iraqis, Afghanis, and especially insurgents, to inform them ‘of’ the military. Isn’t this the obvious corollary to the pledge against assisting the counter-insurgency – namely, to support the insurgency itself? (And what prevents the public articulation of this support? A secret fear of detention, perhaps?) And this, in my opinion, is where the discussion should turn: how can anthropologists, or anyone for that matter, help the insurgents?

As far as I can tell there are three reasons why anthropologists turned out to be such assholes. First, they have a Code of Ethics that forbids them from harming the populations they study. Second, the field is dominated by Lefties of the highest order, those with a rigid intellect that equate working with the American military with supporting an "illegal war" and American "imperialism." (disclaimer: I really don't know the percentage of "lefties" working in the anthropology field, but I suspect there's a lot of them because of the preponderance of lefty comments I read from anthropologists and because they are mostly all academics).

These two reasons--the Code of Ethics and the Lefties--are intertwined. Their rigid intellect does not allow them to differentiate between doing good and doing bad in a combat operations. Their default assumption is that if you work with the military you are basically drafting hit lists and assassination orders and, thus, violating a professional Code of Ethics. In fact, anthropologists participating in the Human Terrain System are doing no such thing. Here's what anthropologist Marcus Griffin is doing in Iraq:

One example is assessing the impact of poor essential services such as sewage, water, electricity, and trash on the population’s willingness to provide aid and comfort to insurgents. Improve the quality of life of local residents by building their satisfaction with the Iraqi Government and they will likely be less willing to harbor insurgents. If they are denied comfort, they have less ability to fight. Less ability to fight means fewer bullets get shot and fewer bombs get dropped.

Read this NYT article for an example of what another anthropologist is doing in Afghanistan.

The third reason some anthropologists are pissed is concern that an association with the military will make their work more difficult. There may be some validity to this, but really, screw them. So, their work might become more difficult? Boo-hoo. Cry me a river. We are talking about saving lives and easing violence in war-torn countries for God's sake! Assholes.

Oh, and God forbid they provide a service to their country. A nation that has provided them the opportunity to get their Ph.D.s and sit in their precious Ivory Towers looking down their noses at all other Americans concerned with making things better in Iraq. Let them not get their prissy hands dirty trying to help their country solve a difficult problem that is killing thousands of American and Iraqi youths. Fucking Assholes.

Short Break

A confluence of events prevents me from bloging this week. Hope to get back in the saddle next week.

PW Singer's Hair is on Fire: On Blackwater and Private Military Companies

A Salon.com article by PW Singer on the problem of Private Military Companies such as Blackwater forced my hand. I had been meaning to blog about this topic since news of the Sept. 16 incident involving Blackwater came to light. The article provided the prompting I needed.

Let me say at the outset that the article was very good and I generally agree with his main point--the US Government has a significant dependence on private contractors--and some of his more minor points, like the inherent conflict between the motivations of private contractors and the mission of the armed forces in Iraq. But Singer lacks nuance, his analysis is incomplete, and his conclusions are shaky.

One example is this paragraph:

When we evaluate the facts, the use of private military contractors appears to have harmed, rather than helped, the counterinsurgency efforts of the U.S. mission in Iraq, going against our best doctrine and undermining critical efforts of our troops. Even worse, the government can no longer carry out one of its most basic core missions: to fight and win the nation's wars. Instead, the massive outsourcing of military operations has created a dependency on private firms like Blackwater that has given rise to dangerous vulnerabilities.

Private military contractors have harmed some counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq. This is quite different than what Singer suggests. The real culprits here are not the contractors but the US Government and US Military leadership, largely because they failed to develop an adequate counterinsurgency strategy until just this year--four years into the war! Blaming military contractors for the counterinsurgency problems in Iraq is just misplaced blame.

Further, private military contractors have helped the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq significantly because, quite frankly, there are not enough forces to do everything that needs to be done. If you think the war is going bad now, you could only imagine how bad it would be if there were no military contractors in Iraq.

Who would transport military supplies around Iraq? Who would train Iraqi units? Who would translate for line units conducting patrols? How would our intelligence agencies get enough interrogators and analysts? How would our diplomats, spies, and other non-military US Government personnel travel around the country if they didn't have contractor-provided security?

To do all of these things without military contractors means that US military forces would have to take on these missions in much greater capacities than what they do know. This means that there would be fewer forces to do the core mission: clearing neighborhoods of insurgents and terrorists, holding the neighborhoods until Iraqi forces can relieve US forces, and moving on to the next neighborhood.

Admittedly, contractors like some Blackwater operators have not helped the hearts and minds campaign in some areas of Iraq. This was evident to me when I was over there and I witnessed first hand some of their very aggressive tactics. They are also a pain in the ass of military commanders who are responsible for areas in which Blackwater operates, but they also provide valuable services that need to be done. Singer, it seems, recognizes this without admitting it when he talks of government dependency on private military contractors.

There are other parts of his article that are off base, such the whole "Abrams Doctrine" discussion (irrelevant because different force structures of the post-Vietnam and the present-day Armies make this "doctrine" unworkable), his callousness when talking about contractor deaths, and his persistent insinuations that military contractors are somehow to blame for the lack of counterinsurgency success.

Here's one paragraph indicative of Singer's misplaced blame:

Basically, the bigger the bases, the more fast-food franchises, the more salsa dance lessons -- and the more money the firms make, while wrapping themselves in the flag. But while bigger bases may yield more money for stockholders, they disconnect a force from the local populace and send a message of a long-term occupation, both major negatives in a counterinsurgency. Moreover, it puts more convoys on the roads, angering the Iraqis and creating more potential targets for insurgents. "It's misguided luxury ... Somebody's risking their life to deliver that luxury," Hammes says, adding, "Fewer vehicles on the road creates less tension with the locals, because they get tired of these high-speed convoys running them off the road."

In this passage Singer correctly diagnoses the counterinsurgency problem of big bases (disconnect the force from the local populace...message of long-term occupation), but he conveniently ignores that such issues associated with military basing are strategic and lay solely within the domain of military planners. Thus, this problem is exclusively the fault of the US military and civilian leaders, not the contractors. The contractors will build and sustain to the contract specifications. It's up to the military to decide how big and how secure and how comfortable they want the bases to be.

Here's another similar passage:

The formula for failure isn't hard to calculate. An Iraqi is driving in Baghdad, on his way to work. A convoy of black-tinted SUVs comes down the highway at him, driving in his lane, but in the wrong direction. They are honking their horns at the oncoming traffic and firing machine gun bursts into the road, in front of any vehicle that gets too close. The Iraqi veers to the side of the road. As the SUVs drive by, Western-looking men in sunglasses point machine guns at him. Over the course of the day, that Iraqi civilian might tell X people about how "the Americans almost killed me today, and all I was doing was trying to get to work." Y is the number of other people that convoy ran off the road on its run that day. Z is the number of convoys in Iraq that day. Multiply X times Y times Z times 365, and you have the mathematical equation of how to lose a counterinsurgency within a year.

Again, there are many ways to lose a counterinsurgency and while the aggressive driving techniques do contribute to ill feelings towards Americans this is hardly the reason why we would lose a counterinsurgency (disclaimer: I have ridden in convoys that employed very aggressive driving tactics, but our security personnel doing the driving where Iraqis, not Americans). Some better reasons would be the failure to establish security immediately following the fall of Baghdad, or the failure to secure the borders, or the disbanding of the Iraqi military, or the piss-poor post-conflict planning.

One of the things I was worried about when the shooting incident happened was that military contractors were going to be scapegoated. Blackwater is, in fact, the perfect scapegoat. Not only are they offensively aggressive and have a cowboy reputation, they also afford the Iraqi government and the US military an opportunity to deflect the spotlight for the quagmire that is Iraq. I am not defending their aggressive tactics and, as I stated earlier, I believe that they have been bad for some aspects of our fight in Iraq, but they should not be thrown under the bus either.

While the military contractors should be held accountable for crimes and civilian deaths, ultimate blame for the consequences of the use of contractors falls upon the US Government. The downsizing of the military following Desert Storm and maintained by the Clinton and Bush administrations left the Services and bureaucracies little choice but to use contractors in virtually every capacity. At the same time, the government also failed to develop clear policies, regulations, and laws to manage and control the activities of the contractors, resulting the gray area in which they now operate.

Exploring Iran's Intent in Latin America: A Theory

With Ahmadinejad's visit to Bolivia last week, Iran began to exploit a foothold it gained in Latin America. This foothold was provided largely by Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, who sees in Iran not only a comrade in his quixotic crusade against the United States, but also a source of inspiration in matters of defiance and defense.

For Iran, Venezuela's adoration is not reciprocal. It's my sense that Iran's interests in Latin America have more to do with not being isolated than with any bilateral relation it may have in the region. This means that its relations with Venezuela or Bolivia or any other country in the region are not as important as simply having those close relations.

This is a time when Iran is facing increasing international pressure over it's covert nuclear weapons program. Its long-time friends in the UN Security Council, Russia and China, have already expressed their displeasure with Iran. Indeed, Russia has even withheld cooperation on a previously-signed nuclear agreement (one that initially had nothing to do with the current nuclear standoff). France, a country that resisted resisting Iran, has now become, with the election of Nicolas Sarkozy, a friend of the US position and one of the more vociferous countries in the anti-Iran coalition-of-the-willing. And while US operations in Afghanistan and Iran have unfettered Iran geopolitically, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt are now more attuned than ever to a perceived threat from Tehran. No doubt a perception encouraged by the American sale of $20 billion dollars worth of arms to many of those countries; an attempt to lay the groundwork for a bulwark against potential Iranian temptations, such as the peninsula's oil fields or a Shi'a dominance.

And even in international finance, Iran is feeling the pinch.

With international isolation increasing, Iran is looking to Chavez to deliver like minded countries and help create a coalition-of-the-defiant, as it were. The principle aim for Tehran is to cultivate UN General Assembly votes in opposition to the nuclear nonproliferation interests of the US and its allies. Bolivia is the first stop. Next on Ahmadinejad's geopolitical itinerary is Nicaragua and, possibly, Ecuador. These countries may be a little bit harder to sell as their leaders have demonstrated less reactionary anti-Americanism than Bolivia's Morales, but be certain that Chavez will lean on them heavily

Of course, it's too soon to tell if Iran's strategy will bear fruit. I doubt it, but if nothing else, it will certainly be interesting to watch future developments.

Even More on Evo on the Daily Show

As usual, I'm a little late to the party (it's what not being able to blog until the end of a long day does to me). Evo appeared on the Daily Show on Tuesday and it's just about all the craze in the Bolivian-American blogosphere these days. All of the blogs I like to visit, Pronto*, MABB, Boz, Gringo Tambo, and others, have covered it.

I provided my two cents to some friends and family earlier today and I thought I'd just get to the botoom line now: Evo did well but thank goodness John Stewart is a comedian and not a real journalist. Otherwise, things could have gotten ugly.

Bolivia and Iran to Initiate Diplomatic Relations (Updated)

Apropos the post below, it appears that Ahmedinejad is now going to go to Bolivia on Thursday. La Razon reports that he will be bearing gifts too: the initiation of diplomatic relations with La Paz and the strengthening of commercial ties. Again, I just don't see what's in this for Bolivia.

Update: Ahmadinejad arrived in Bolivia this afternoon and already the newspapers are fretting over how this will affect US-Bolivian relations. In this post, Bolivian blogger Mario Duran provides a glimpse into the status of Bolivian civil liberties in Evo's democracy. Why is it relevant? Because it happend while he waited for Ahmadinejad's motorcade to pass.

The Mystery of Bolivia-Iran Relations

I don't get Evo Morales. I mean, I understand that he is knee-jerk anti-American and has a man-crush on Hugo Chavez, but I don't get why he is so careless at times. So seemingly myopic.
Case in point: Iran. Iran is a country that has managed to piss-off the Americans, Europeans, most Middle Eastern countries, and even the Russians and the Chinese. It is a country that kidnaps, for what else would you call it, innocent expats that return home for a visit with the family. A country the US claims, with justification, is actively supporting combat operations against US troops in Iraq and NATO troops in Afghanistan. A country that is known to support terrorists organizations such as Hezbollah. A country whose leader has expressed the wish that Israel should be wiped off the map. A country that is pursuing a nuclear weapons program and is in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. A country that has such bad relations with the US that many observers around the world are already beating war drums.

For Bolivia, this last point is particularly important. The US is the second most important market for Bolivian exports (behind Brazil) as well as a significant source of foreign assistance. Just as Venezuela is Bolivia's political and ideological patrón, the US is a major component of Bolivia's economic lifeline. US-Bolivian relations may not be at their most enlightened right now, but Bolivia is still significantly dependent on the US. Witness Alvaro Garcia Linera's recent visit to the US, lobbying for an extension of trade preferences.

Given the dynamics of the US-Bolivian relationship, why would the Bolivian government be cozying up to Iran at this particular time and run the risk of further eroding its relationship with the United States? One potential "benefit" for Bolivia could be further cementing its relationship with Venezuela (as there is no tangible benefit that a relationship with Iran can provide that will not be off-set by a break in US-Bolivia relations). But what can Iran do for Bolivia? Neither Iranian military nor political support count for much given Venezuela's competing influence (as well as the Chinese influence in the arms arena). Sure, Bolivia can talk about Iranian investment in Bolivian energy, but Iran is not the only country that is willing to do this.

It seems, then, that Bolivia is doing this only for the benefit of Venezuela (because Chavez's stock rises in the eyes of Ahmedinejad if Venezuela is able to "deliver" countries to Iran). Worse, not only does Bolivia not gain anything, its own interests are held at significant risk because, whether it wants to admit it or not, Bolivia needs the US to stay at least economically engaged. The US is not going to break relations over any one issue, but an accumulation of "issues" may drive the US to take a harder stance and that can only be bad for Bolivia. I don't see how Bolivia "wins" in this scenario, particularly given the dangers of further isolating the US. It's just poor statecraft.

Vigilantism in Guatemala

Yesterday, Reuters came out with an article on vigilantism in Guatemala, a consequence of the on-going gang problem. This is not the first report of it kind. There have been similar reports focused on other countries in Central America. El Salvador comes to mind (though I can't locate that article).

The gang problem in Central America does not get the type of serious attention and consideration it deserves. It is a slow-motion train wreck with significant implications for human rights, governability, democracy, and to some degree, even US security. Whatever gains have been made since the end of the wars in Central America, they are threatened by the gang crisis. Vigilante groups could easily evolve to into gangs. Police can easily be, and have been, involved in extrajudicial killings. Impunity can be rampant. In nearly all of these countries the military is operating in "support" of police forces, without adequate legal authorities, command and control mechanisms, and competent judicial structures. This is bad juju and it does not take much imagination for this scenario to spiral into failing state category.

Bolivian Army's Evolving Mission

Two articles came out in La Razon yesterday and today dealing with the Bolivian Army's elite baking unit, the 44th Regimental Baking Company. Just kidding, that's not the name of the unit. And the Bolivian Army doesn't have an elite baking unit. Not yet. (sidebar: boy, La Razon is really a good paper to get information dealing with Bolivian security forces. You'll notice I cite them aplenty) .

Anyway, these are a good set of articles to discuss the role of the armed forces in society. According to the articles, Evo Morales presented the Army with a "gift" of some industrial ovens and now the Service has a new mission, to make bread for the surrounding community. The concept, apparently, is that the Army will bake the bread and sell it at a reduced cost to citizens. There is some debate over details, such as should the bread be primarily for the consumption of the Army and only the surplus sold to civilians or should enough bread be made to feed the Army and sell to the civilians, but it seems clear that the future for some Army units means baking bread for the surrounding population.

Though it seems silly on the face of it, in fact this is not necessarily a bad use, if inefficient, of Bolivia's armed forces. Unlike militaries in developed countries, militaries in underdeveloped countries like Bolivia are already being used in to supporting civilian infrastructure. For example, in Bolivia the Air Force already operates commercial flights to the interior. In other countries, such as Armenia, Army garrisons make their health facilities available to townspeople. These types of "additional duties" are not necessarily bad and they do provide a valuable service to the country (though some "services" are more controversial than others, such as when the military provides school teachers, as has happened in Venezuela).

Of course, there are trade-offs. While these types of duties may aid the country in some ways, they can also hamper it in others and, as well, retard the capabilities of the military. In this case, the subsidised military bread will surely undercut some family-owned, small business bakeries. Of course, every time the military gets involved in commercial sales the possibility of graft and corruption are there. And if the business generates enough revenue, then effective civilian and democratic control of the military can also become an issue if not adequately controlled. On the other side of the coin, while the Army's bread may be cheaper for civilians, the cost to the government to produce the bread is likely significant in actual cost and in the opportunity cost associated with having soldiers baking and selling as opposed to training for combat or civil disturbance. And, let's be candid, Bolivia's armed forces need all the training they can get.

A related question, and one that is beyond the scope of this current post, gets at the shifting threat environment in Latin America and how this affects, or should affect, the roles and responsibilities of the region's militaries.

Bolivian MANPADS Redux

File this under It Could Be Nothing, But....

In 2005 the US rendered a bunch of Bolivian Chinese-made MANPADS inoperable. With the agreement of the Bolivian Armed Forces, the US took these weapons from their storage locations in Bolivia and flew them to the US for a quick snip-and-tuck. From the US perspective, in a post 9-11 world it wasn't a good idea to have poorly secured MANPADS floating around. And, given the lose Bolivian controls and porous borders, Bolivia seemed a likely candidate in which to implement this policy.

So imagine my surprise when I saw this article reporting that, in Brazil, between April 2005 and July 2007, Brazilian cops confiscated 9 "anti-air" weapons (armas antiaéreas) with the Bolivian Coat of Arms stamped on them.

Obviously, this means that the Bolivian Army or Ministry of Defense officials are selling weapons. I get that. Not a big surprise. But what I don't understand is what the heck are "armas antiaéreas"? That sounds like air defense weapons to me, but could they be...MANPADS? What other kinds of "armas antiaéreas" could they be talking about? They surely can't be talking about anti-aircraft guns, I can't imagine those suckers being dragged through the jungle (with due respect to the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu and the North Vietnamese Army at Khe Sanh--at least those guys were fighting a war).

Does this mean that the US missed some MANPADS? Or that they new of the leakage and that is what prompted the US to act in Bolivia? Of course, the article could be just plain wrong. It could be spin or an outright lie. Like I said, it could be nothing, but....

Smart Politics: US Certifies Bolivia in the Drug War

It appears that the US has certified Bolivia's fight against illicit drugs. In doing so, US aid to Bolivia will not be interrupted. Laying aside the monumental failure and waste of time that the US "war on drugs" has become, the Bush administration's decision to certify Bolivia is smart politics (and another example of why Assistant Secretary Tom Shannon is the right man at the right time). First, Bolivia is teetering on the edge of chaos and the last thing the US needs to do is insert itself in this combustible mix. A de-certification could have created a rallying cry for Evo's supporters and aggrieved nationalists and, undoubtedly, put some wind back in Evo's sails (at a time when, it appears, he is backing into a corner and could possibly make some concessions to the opposition). No need to push Bolivia into failed state status.

Also, a de-certification would have aided Chavez's cause more than ours. I know many proud Bolivians and Evo supporters like to pretend otherwise, but Evo is Chavez's puppet. There is very little free agency going on here. The US recognizes this and, in its policy, it *should* seek to drive a wedge between the two knuckleheads. The drug certification process does this by de-certifying Venezuela, but certifying Bolivia. A Bolivian de-certification would have validated, in Evo's and his supporters' eyes, the relationship with Chavez. It would have strengthened the Venezuela-Bolivia relationship and further weakened the US-Bolivia relationship.

Buyer Beware: Chavez Invests in Bolivian Security Forces

Interesting article in La Razón, today. Apparently the Bolivian police and the military are accusing each other of accepting Venezuelan aid.

General Wilfredo Vargas, Commander of the Armed Forces, denied that Venezuela provides assistance to the armed forces and asked that such questions be raised with the National Police.

The Inspector General of the National Police, Fernando Peláez, responded that his institution is not the one that received checks for forts, just equipment that will benefit the country’s citizens. (My translation)

In Bolivia there is long-standing enmity between the armed forces and the national police due to jealousies and mistrust over social status, funding, and a blurring of appropriate roles and missions caused by the war on drugs. In February 2003, the National Police mutinied in La Paz and the resulting rebellion saw military personnel engaging police in intense, if limited, firefights.

It is extremely unlikely that a police vs. military confrontation in the scale of the February 2003 rebellion will take place soon. But interesting to note how both institutions are playing this charade of “no, we don’t get aid from Venezuela” when, in fact, both organizations have received assistance from Chavez and will continue to do so.

So, what’s the story behind these denials? A couple of weeks ago Bolivia’s Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramon Quintana, denounced several social scientist types for working with USAID or on projects funded by USAID. Quintana allegedly called these people “vendepatria,” which is akin to being called a traitor. No one likes to be called a “vendepatria,” especially those whose jobs are to secure the patria.

But, in the interest of keeping things real, let’s recall this La Razon article from two weeks ago.

Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramon Quintana, confirmed yesterday that Venezuela directly deposits US$6 million into accounts opened by the Bolivian government for use by the military services to improve military infrastructure. (my translation)

The article goes on to say that in June the Army received US$5,491,462, the Navy US$1,181,000, and the Air Force US$771,395.

It’s official, Chavez is buying the country’s military. Who’s the vendepatria now?

Colombia shifts its eradication strategy

Last fall I attended a security cooperation conference sponsored by the National Defense University. One of the speakers was a Colombian government official who let it be known the Uribe government was investigating the possibility of shifting its drug eradication strategy from aerial spraying to manual eradication. Had I blog back then, I would have blogged about it as it is a significant development. Since that conference nearly one year ago, it appears that the Uribe government has made up its mind.

Colombia's vice president said Sunday that a U.S.-backed program to fumigate coca fields is failing to stem cocaine trafficking and called for anti-drug efforts to shift away from the practice. Vice President Francisco Santos' comments were Bogota's strongest critique yet of Washington's multibillion-dollar anti-narcotics strategy here, and came on the heels of a Senate vote to slash funding for the Colombian drug war.

"After a five-year frontal attack against drug trafficking, the results aren't the most successful or the ones we hoped for," Santos told a news conference.

Here’s the full article. In the interest of balance, let me address the anti-American slant in the quote above. As its underwriter, the United States does bear significant influence on Colombia’s drug eradication strategy. Without US assistance, it is unlikely that Colombia would have enough resources to both fight the insurgency and the drug trafficking. However, to lay the aerial spraying solely at the door of the US is problematic and intellectually dishonest. While the US has influence and funding, Colombia has veto power. It is their country. The aerial spraying may have been proposed by the US (or not, I really don’t know what the genesis of this is), but the Colombian government has always been an eager and willing participant.

I can speculate as to why aerial spraying was initially chosen as the eradication strategy of choice. First, starting up aerial spraying is cheaper than manual eradication. All you need is a few planes, a small crew, fuel, and herbicide. For manual eradicators you would need very many of them and they each would need to be trained, provided with uniforms and equipment, fed, and housed. The cost for all of this is significantly larger. Second, aerial spraying is more efficient. Whereas it would take a platoon of manual eradicators significant time to clear one field (whatever size) of illicit coca, presumably a couple of plane loads of herbicide could do the job in just a few swoops and the pilot can return to base in time for breakfast. Third, it is less violent than manual eradication since you avoid, to a much larger degree, direct conflict between the eradicators and the coca growers, traffickers, and guerrilla forces (which ever the case may be). Sure, there may be a plane crash or a shoot down here and there, but by and large, it is a significantly less violent form of eradication.

There are some downsides to this strategy, however, and these may have contributed to the decision to stop aerial spraying. First, aerial spraying is susceptible to countering tactics. In this case, coca growers developed an early warning system so that they had time to cover their crops while the plane was in-bound. This neutralized the herbicide as it never reached the coca leaves. Similarly, once the plane left, cultivators would immediately wash out the herbicide with buckets of water thereby limiting its effectiveness. Second, aerial spraying was effective when cultivators planted in open fields on hill sides. But cultivators quickly adapted and began planting inside national forests where the canopy limited somewhat the growth of their crops but also negated the government’s ability to spray. Also, if you really want to be sure a crop is eradicated, there is only way to do it: rip it from the soil, roots and all. In short, as the “enemy” adapted, aerial spraying reached its culmination point. It simply was no longer as effective as when it was first employed.

Coca eradication is a significant challenge. Ask the Bolivians. Given the risks associated with manual eradication, expect to see increased violence in the Colombian countryside and, as well, increased allegations of human rights violations. And also, much slower progress. On the plus side, maybe some of the demobilized paras can now be gainfully employed.